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Terrorism Finance, Business Associations, and the
"Incorporation Transparency Act"
J. W Verret*
I. INTRODUCTION
Each year, two million corporations and limited liability
companies are established in the United States. The process by
which these entities are created has traditionally been governed
under state law. On June 18, 2009, the Senate Homeland Security
Committee considered a bill introduced by Senators Levin,
Grassley, and McCaskill, titled the "Incorporation Transparency
and Law Enforcement Assistance Act" (the "Levin Bill" or "the
Bill"). The Levin Bill requires that states maintain an accurate and
updated list of all beneficial owners of corporations and limited
liability companies created in the state and make that list available
to law enforcement and others by subpoena.' In many states, these
lists will likely become part of the states' public records similar to
other business entities' formation documents.
Business entities, including corporations, limited liability
companies (LLCs), limited liability partnerships (LLPs), non-profit
organizations, and other entities created under hybrid forms, are
created when formation documents are filed with the Secretary of
State of a particular state. States require that business entities
maintain updated contact information of an agent for service of
process to facilitate litigation against a business entity, but, owing
to the complexities of business ownership, states do not currently
undertake the task of keeping an up-to-date list of all current
owners of all business entities organized under their laws.
In support of the Levin Bill, its proponents cite a handful of
cases investigated by federal agencies that were later dropped
because of difficulty determining beneficial ownership in the
investigated entities as evidence for why the bill is vital to stopping
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terrorism financing.2 However, a proper analysis of the effects,
costs, and potential constitutional challenges facing the Bill reveals
it as little more than a red herring-an empty gesture meant to
generate the appearance of action. Furthermore, although
legitimate prosecution of business entities engaging in activities
that represent a threat to national security or violate tax, banking,
or securities laws is a vital element of the federal government's
law enforcement mandate, this does not mean that state
governments should be enlisted to support the Department of
Justice (DOJ) merely because federal prosecutors find their work
too difficult or expensive.
This Article will examine the costs of the Levin Bill and
compare those costs with its purported benefits. As such, in part this
Article offers an exercise in cost-benefit analysis. The analysis will
remain somewhat stylized, without the need for formal modeling,
simply because the legislative architecture under review offers scant
benefit toward the goals listed in its opening clauses. This Article
will show that the Levin Bill stands to impose significant liability on
small businesses. The Article will describe how the Levin Bill
threatens the existing function that business entities serve in
economic development, as well as how it threatens to irreparably
harm the attorney-client relationship. It will also describe how the
Levin Bill offers little benefit, as it will be unable to prevent or
reliably detect terrorism finance. Lastly, the Article will examine
alternatives to the Bill that have been put forward.
The Levin Bill may not necessarily pass as it is currently crafted;
however, the analysis in this Article is still highly relevant. The
problems inherent in the Levin Bill's approach will creep into any
variation on the Bill's theme of a federal mandate to track
controlling beneficial owners of companies and other business
entities. This Article's focus on the provisions in the current Bill will
remain useful no matter what variation is considered. This is shown
by the Article's final analysis of alternative measures put forward by
the Senate Banking Committee and the Uniform Law Commission.
2. Examining State Business Incorporation Practices: A Discussion of S.
569. the Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act:
Hearing on S. 569 Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental
Affairs, 111th Cong. 7 (2009) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 569, Kaufmann
Testimony] (statement of Adam S. Kaufnann, Assistant District Attorney for
New York County, State of New York).
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II. DETAILS OF THE LEVIN BILL
The Levin Bill mandates that states require corporations and
limited liability companies to maintain with the state in which the
business entity was formed an up-to-date list of all beneficial
owners. 3 A beneficial owner is defined as "an individual who has a
level of control over, or entitlement to, the funds or assets ... that,
as a practical matter, enables the individual, directly or indirectly,
to control, manage, or direct the corporation or limited liability
company.' 4 The Levin Bill also requires that the state maintain a
copy of driver's licenses of all such beneficial owners. 5 The state is
then required to turn information over to law enforcement or
federal agencies requesting information through subpoena or
pursuant on an international treaty.6 The Levin Bill carries stiff
penalties for business entities failing to maintain an accurate list of
their beneficial owners with the state.7 As a penalty for violation of
the Bill, a business owner can be fined up to $10,000 and sent to
prison for up to three years for failure to maintain accurate
beneficial ownership information with their state of formation.
The Levin Bill requires annual reporting that updates the
states' list of beneficial owners. 8 The Bill also contains a provision
that affords generous access to the beneficial ownership list,
mandating that states make the list available upon "(i) a civil or
criminal subpoena or summons from a State agency, Federal
agency, or congressional committee or subcommittee requesting
such information; or (ii) a written request made by a Federal
agency on behalf of another country under an international treaty,
agreement, or convention . . . .10 Nevertheless, since most states
would be required to keep beneficial ownership information open
to the public, the wide restrictions would become fairly irrelevant,
leaving the federal government with a nearly limitless ability to
access the ownership information.'
The Levin Bill is the third beneficial ownership bill that the
Senate has considered in the last ten years, and the second was one
of the few bills endorsed by then-Senator Obama. The Levin Bill
was the subject of hearings before the Senate Homeland Security
Committee in July and November of 2009. The issue of beneficial
3. See S. 569.
4. Id. § 2009(e)(1).
5. See S. 569.
6. Id. § 2009(a)(1)(D).
7. Id. § 2009(b).
8. See S. 569.
9. Id. § 2009(a)(1)(D)(i)-(ii).
10. See Part V.A.
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ownership reporting has recently become the subject of a turf battle
between the Senate Homeland Security Committee and the Senate
Banking Committee, where Chairman Dodd introduced a
competing discussion draft.1 A companion to the Levin Bill was
introduced in the House of Representatives in 2009. With the
support of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the DOJ,
the Treasury Department, and numerous senators on both sides of
the aisle, it seems likely that beneficial ownership reporting will
become law in some form. With the Levin Bill currently serving as
the chief vehicle for the debate, a particular focus on the Bill seems
appropriate.
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF BENEFICIAL
OWNERSHIP REPORTING
A. Internal Inconsistencies
At one level, the Levin Bill is internally inconsistent; even if
one were to accept that beneficial ownership reporting will provide
benefits sufficient to justify the costs to business entity creation,
the Bill is designed in a manner that leaves loopholes that may lead
to abuse of the nation's business entity creation system. For
example, the Bill requires that the states collect and maintain
beneficial ownership information on corporations and LLCs but
not on LLPs, non-profit organizations, or other business entities.1
2
As such, it is ineffective at hindering use of those entities for the
crimes that the Levin Bill is intended to stop. Even if terrorists
were to comply with the self-reporting requirements of the Bill,
they could nevertheless merely switch to using these alternative
business entity types for their illegal activities.
The National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS) also
testified that non-profits would be nearly impossible to regulate
under a beneficial ownership reporting regime, as they essentially
do not have beneficial owners of any identifiable sort. In light of
this fact, non-profits could become the new weapon of choice for
money launderers under the present Bill. This could have the
11. The source is the author's own knowledge from working with the
Committee.
12. See S. 569, § 2009(a)(1)(A).
13. Examining State Business Incorporation Practices: A Discussion of S.
569: the Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act.
Hearing on S. 569 Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental
Affairs, llth Cong. 8 (2009) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 569, Marshall
Testimony] (statement of Elaine F. Marshall, Secretary of State of North
Carolina).
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unintended consequence of tarnishing the reputation of the non-
profit community. Indeed, evidence indicates that al-Qaeda
operatives make significant use of non-profit charities in financing
their operations, making their switch to non-profit entities-to the
extent that they find use of entities necessary at all-more likely.'4
The strongest critique of the Levin Bill is that it relies on
individuals voluntarily reporting their beneficial ownership
information. Indeed, the burden of the Levin Bill will fall most
strongly on the companies least likely to break the law. In
testimony before the Senate Oversight Committee, the U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement staff listed the types of
investigations considered germane to the Bill, including money
laundering, corruption, fraud, tax evasion, immigration and visa
fraud, and financing terrorism.' 5 What is unique about those crimes
is that they all include an element of fraud-perpetrators of the
actual crime under investigation have to commit fraud as part of
the crime. As such, those targets would also be the most likely to
frustrate the purposes of the Bill by committing fraud in their
reporting of beneficial ownership information to state secretaries of
state.
Furthermore, states' compliance with the Levin Bill would
effectively remove Homeland Security grant funding from other
anti-terrorism efforts by local and state law enforcement and
require states to use that funding for the new ownership reporting
regime. If the states were to comply with the Bill, it would result in
significant new costs to state governments without any additional
appropriation to offset that cost. These costs include funding the
hardware, software, and personnel required to collect, preserve,
and make publicly available ownership information on thousands
of business entities.'
6
One issue regarding the implementation of the Levin Bill
involves what would happen in the event an LLC or corporation
requested information from a beneficial owner and that beneficial
owner was unwilling to provide the information. Could the LLC
simply report that the owner was non-responsive but that the LLC
made a good faith effort to comply? Would the Treasury
14. See THE 9/11 COMMIssION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE UNITED STATES (2004).
15. See Examining State Business Incorporation Practices: A Discussion of
S. 569: the Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act:
Hearing on S. 569 Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental
Affairs, 111 th Cong. (2009) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 569, Ayala Testimony]
(statement of Janice Ayala, Deputy Assistant Director, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security).
16. See Hearing on S. 569, Marshall Testimony, supra note 13.
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Department regulation instead require that the non-complying
owner be prohibited from purchasing an interest in the business
entity? If owners in existing business entities are covered by the
Bill and their non-compliance resulted in the LLC owner being
forced to sell his interest, it may implicate a Takings Clause
challenge. Indeed, in the event that many of the eighteen million
business entities in the United States found themselves unable to
collect accurate beneficial ownership information, and were thus
forced to nullify the investments of many of their owners, it could
have a disastrous effect on small businesses and result in a torrent
of alternative entity litigation.
On the other hand, though the Levin Bill does not currently
provide this, the statute or implementing regulations could provide
that entities already created would not be subject to the act, but
merely new entities would be required to file. In that event,
existing shell companies would be maintained, and a rush of new
companies could be created just prior to implementation of the rule
so that shell companies could be readily purchased, through which
criminals could continue to avert the objectives of the Bill.
Straw transactors could also subvert the purposes of the Levin
Bill's disclosure rule. A similar problem was faced by the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) in the
regulation of gun sales, where handgun purchasers whose criminal
history restricted their ability to purchase handguns got others to
purchase the handguns for them. ATF has found that many illegal
gun purchases take place through "straw men," or purchasers who
do not show up when their names are run through registries of
ineligible gun purchasers. 17 One would expect that, if they were
using business entities at all, terrorists or those planning to engage
in money laundering would use straw men to form similar business
entities. One prosecutor testifying in favor of the Levin Bill even
surprisingly noted that participants in money laundering operations
use straw men to open bank accounts. 8 The United Nations report
on terrorism indicated that individuals holding assets on behalf of
those included on watch lists subvert anti-terrorism efforts, 19 and
this problem could be equally relevant to using beneficial
17. See United States v. Nunez-Sanchez, 478 F.3d 663, 664 (5th Cir. 2007).
18. Hearing on S. 569, Kaufmann Testimony, supra note 2.
19. U.N. Sec. Council, See. Council Comm. Established Pursuant to
Resolution 1267 (1999) Concerning Afghanistan, Second report of the group
Monitoring Group Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1363
(2001) and Extended by Resolution 1390 (2002), 37, U.N. Doc. S/2002/1050
(Sept. 20, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/
1050E02.pdf [hereinafter Second Report of the S.C. Res. 1363 Monitoring
Group].
862 [Vol. 70
INCORPORATION TRANSPARENCY A CT
ownership information because the true beneficial owners could
report the names of "straw men" on their formation documents.
Another complication could make the Levin Bill's approach
nearly impossible to administrate. The Bill requires that entities
maintain a photocopy of a government issued ID of all beneficial
owners with the state of incorporation, but individuals from all
around the world form entities in states in the United States.2 ° As a
result, states could find themselves in the difficult position of
trying to verify the validity of passports or local IDs from hundreds
of foreign nations or potentially thousands of sub-regions of
nations.
B. Difficulties in Determining Control
The Levin Bill defines beneficial owner as "an individual who
has a level of control over, or entitlement to, the funds or assets of
a corporation or limited liability company that, as a practical
matter, enables the individual, directly or indirectly, to control
manage, or direct the corporation or limited liability company.2i
This definition links notions of ownership with notions of control,
in effect treating them as though they are the same idea. As such, it
implicates some very complex questions that arise in determining
whether someone has control of a business entity.
There are two possible methods to implement a reporting
regime to track possible illegal activity. One would be a focus on
owners, the other a focus merely on those individuals or owners
who actually control the company. The latter offers a clearer view
of those who might be using the entity for illegal purposes, and yet,
defining control, as this Section will show, is a particularly
difficult task. A focus only on owners is much simpler to
implement, but focusing on investors who may have no knowledge
of the underlying business casts a wide net that requires reporting
compliance by large numbers of individuals whose personal
information will have no benefit to law enforcement. A similar
argument has been raised with respect to a proposal to require
reporting of beneficial owners of ships bringing cargo into U.S.
ports.22
20. See S. 569, 111th Cong. (2009).
21. Id. § 2009(e)(1).
22. See J. Bennet Fox, Jr., Vessel Ownership and Terrorism: Requiring
Disclosure of Beneficial Ownership is Not the Answer, 4 LoY. MAR. L.J. 92, 100
(2005).
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The Levin Bill implicates the definition of control in
determining the beneficial owners who must comply when it
states:
Each application to form a corporation or limited liability
company under the laws of the State is required to provide
to the State during the formation process a list of the
beneficial owners of the corporation or limited liability
company that-(i) identifies each beneficial owner by
name and current address; and (ii) if any beneficial owner
exercises control over the corporation or limited liability
company through another legal entity, such as a
corporation, partnership, or trust, identifies each such legal
entity and each such beneficial owner who will use that
entity to exercise control over the corporation or limited
liability company.
23
The Bill's penalties are particularly harsh in light of the
inherent difficulties in determining beneficial ownership of entities
with a large number of owners, some of whom may be corporate
entities themselves. Business entities often trade ownership in
themselves and entities in which they invest in order to segregate
specific investment risks and place them with the pool of
investment capital most appropriate for that investment's risk
profile and time horizon.24 This process benefits large financial
conglomerates, small businesses, union pension funds, university
endowments, hedge funds, private equity funds, and state teachers'
retirement funds alike.
The realities of business ownership, with its complex holding
arrangements, make the costs of the Levin Bill prohibitive.
Holdings are often structured with a network of ownership using
flow-through entities. Powerful contractual rights are often held by
non-shareholders.2 5 This is done for legitimate tax efficiency
planning purposes as well as to sell specific interests to groups of
investors or to secure specific assets to interested creditors. For
example, the ownership structure of the Carlyle Group, one of the26
largest private equity fund complexes in the world, or of a typical
grocery store franchise can share the quality of being held through
complex business entities governed by even more complex credit
23. S. 569, § 2009(a)(1)(A).
24. Bernard S. Black & Ronald Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of
Capital Markets, Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. EcoN. 243 (1998).
25. Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon Insolvency: Proper Scope of
Director's Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REv. 1485 (1993).
26. See DAN BRIODY, THE IRON TRIANGLE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF
THE CARLYLE GROUP (2003).
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agreements. The Bill holds criminally liable any business failing to
keep an accurate listing of its "beneficial owners" with the state in
which it is registered, thus subjecting the two million businesses
that form every year to unreasonable liability for a number of open
questions concerning the real meaning of "beneficial owner" in
today's business environment.
With its passing reference to "control" as a trigger for
beneficial ownership reporting, the Levin Bill fails to appreciate
the complexities of determining shareholder control in business
law. In some situations, holding a majority of shares can give a
shareholder control over a business entity, but that is most
certainly not a foregone conclusion. For instance, if the corporation
has a staggered board, or one for which only a third of the directors
go up for election each year, then holding a majority of shares will
not actually give a shareholder control.27 This is because a
shareholder could not vote out a majority of the board with one
election, but would have to wait for two successive elections to
obtain control. By the same token, holding a small percentage of
voting shares can give a shareholder control over a company in
certain circumstances, as informed by the Treasury Department's
determination that for the purposes of its regulation of investment
by foreign States in U.S. entities that hold national significance, a
mere ten percent ownership is sufficient for an inference of
control.
28
The application of many provisions of state corporate laws and
federal securities laws frequently requires determinations of
whether a shareholder has control of a company.29 As such,
decisions that determine what constitutes "control" under these
laws provide a line of analysis that is likely to inform
determinations of control for the purposes of applying the Levin
Bill's beneficial ownership reporting requirements.
One Delaware court determined that a forty percent
shareholder was a controlling,,arty on a realization that not all
shareholders vote in elections. The court noted that it must "take
into account the fact that a 100% turn-out is unlikely even in a
27. Lucian A. Bebchuk, John C. Coates & Guhan Subramanian, The
Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards, 54 STAN. L. REv. 887
(2002).
28. See 31 C.F.R. § 800 (2008).
29. See, e.g., determinations of whether fiduciary duties apply to the
controlling shareholder in Cysive, or determinations of whether a controlling
shareholder faced joint and several liability with the issuer under the securities
laws as required under Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 78t
(2006).
30. In re Cysive, Inc. S'holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531 (Del. Ch. 2003).
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contested election. A 40% block is very potent in view of that
reality.",31 Another Delaware case from 1995 took judicial notice
that the typical voting rate at that time would range between eighty
and eighty-five percent:
The Court of Chancery and all parties agree that proxy
contests do not generate 100% shareholder participation.
The shareholder plaintiffs argue that 80-85% may be a
usual turnout. Therefore, without the Repurchase Program,
the director shareholders' absolute voting power of 23%
would already constitute actual voting power greater than
25% in a proxy contest with normal shareholder
participation below 100%.32
The Delaware judges have noted the inconsistencies, stating,
"We recognize that this makes the question 'what constitutes a
change of control transaction?' important, and that much work
remains to be done in helping the bar answer the question." '33 For
example, in Kahn v. Lynch, the Delaware Supreme Court
determined that forty-three percent stock ownership was sufficient
to constitute control.34 The court reasoned that with regard to the
exercise of control, the:
[S]hareholder who owns less than 50% of a corporation's
outstanding stocks does not, without more, become a
controlling shareholder of that corporation, with a
concomitant fiduciary status. For a dominating relationship
to exist in the absence of controlling stock ownership, a
plaintiff must allege domination by a minority shareholder
through actual control of corporation conduct.
And yet, the Delaware general corporation law takes precisely the
opposite approach, noting in Section 203 that
[a] person who is the owner of 20% or more of the
outstanding voting stock of any corporation, partnership,
unincorporated association or other entity shall be
31. Id. at 552 n.30 (citing Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361,
1381 (Del. 1995)).
32. Unitrin, Inc., 651 A.2d at 1381 (citing Berlin v. Emerald Partners, 552
A.2d 482 (Del. 1989)).
33. William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function Over
Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law,
56 Bus. LAW. 1287, 1321 n.130 (2001).
34. Kahn v. Lynch Commc'ns Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
35. Id. at 1114 (citing Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569
A.2d 53, 70 (Del. 1989)).
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presumed to have control of such entity, in the absence of
proof by a preponderance of the evidence to the contrary.
36
Control is a basic concept that also runs through the securities
laws. Some securities laws enhance the burden or liability facing
controlling shareholders or persons, while others specifically
prohibit actions that create certain control relationships. 7 In some
areas, the securities laws take a direct approach and prescribe a
certain percentage of ownership as constituting control, such as the
presumption of the Investment Company Act of the 1940s that a
twenty-five percent ownership position in a company constitutes
control.38 Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act, premised on creating
an early warning system for other shareholders to warn them of an
emerging controlling shareholder, requires a public filing of a
shareholder's holdings upon any shareholder taking ownership in
five percent of the voting securities of an issuer 9 Section 16,
which governs insider trading liability by controlling shareholders,
takes effect by statute once a shareholder obtains a ten percent
interest.40
Indicia of control other than percentage ownership have been
used in both securities law and other areas to define control. These
include:
[P]ower to prevent significant action . . . because of
ownership of stock; power to prevent the formation of a
quorum for the transaction of business; sufficient number of
shares to constitute a majority of those usually in attendance
at a shareholders' meeting even if not a majority of shares
outstanding; participation in the financing of the enterprise;
close and intimate family relationships; ability to control if
default occurred on preferred dividendpayments; . . . and
"historical and contractual associations.
' ' I
These factors are used contextually and typically result in
determinations of control when a number of them are present
together.4
2
36. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(c)(4) (Supp. 2010).
37. A. A. Sommer, Who's "In Control"?-S.E.C., 21 BUs. LAW. 559, 559
(1966).
38. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(a)(9), 15 U.S.C. § 80a (2006).
39. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2006).
40. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2006).
41. Sommer, supra note 37, at 575 (quoting In re United Chems., Inc., 23
S.E.C. 456 (1946)).
42. Id. at 576.
2010]
L 0 UISIANA LAW RE VIE W
Through Section 405 of the Exchange Act, the Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC) has offered that "[t]he term control
(including the terms controlling, controlled by and under common
control with) means the possession, direct or indirect, of the power
to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a
person, whether throuh the ownership of voting securities, by
contract, or otherwise.' While this is a broad definition, the SEC
staff interprets it more broadly still. The standard practitioner's
advice is that a ten percent holding "should create caution" and
might even "creat[e] a rebuttable presumption of control,
especially if such holdings are combined with executive office,
membership, on the board, or wide dispersion of the remainder of
the stock."" The SEC recently noted the "widely held belief that
the ownership of 20% ... voting power in a widely held company
in most instances constitutes control.,
45
A substantial line of authority supports the proposition that
either the power to control or the actual exercise of control is
sufficient, particularly in ways that do not involve the ownership of
an equity interest at all. In Walston & Co., the SEC held that the
power to control, as evidenced by the creditor's right to ninety
percent of profits, its status as the source of most of Walston's
business, and its option to acquire stock, constituted control despite
the fact that the creditor did not participate in the actual
management of the business and held no actual stock.46 In effect,
the power to control is sufficient to make one a controlling person,
despite the fact that the power is never actually exercised and the
defendant did not actually own any stock. S.E.C. v. Franklin Atlas
Corp.47 also supports the notion that the percentage of stock
ownership is not alone determinative. In that case, a manager with
the ability to control an enterprise was determined to be a control
person, even though he actually owned no stock, and the company
had a controlling shareholder who owned a majority of the stock.4g
Another complication could arise where a shareholder owns
shares in a company directly and also owns shares indirectly
43. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2008); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2009).
44. Raymond A. Enstam & Harry K. Kamen, Control and the Institutional
Investor, 23 Bus. LAW. 289, 315 (1968) (the "rule of thumb" for the potential
existence of working control is ten percent).
45. Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes Relating to the Shareholder
Approval Policy, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,490, 30,492 n.23 (July 14, 1989).
46. Sommer, supra note 37, at 564 (citing Waltson & Co., 7 S.E.C. 937
(1940)).
47. Id. at 565 (citing S.E.C. v. Franklin Atlas Corp., 154 F. Supp. 395(S.D.N.Y. 1957)).
48. Franklin Atlas Corp., 154 F. Supp. at 400.
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through intermediary shell companies. Proponents of the Levin
Bill or a similar beneficial ownership reporting approach might
argue that one should simply consolidate ownership through
intermediary holding companies using an assumption that a
shareholder also owns any shares owned by an entity that the
shareholder controls. Further, you could assume that a shareholder
owns any shares controlled by an entity that is itself owned (or
controlled) by an entity that the shareholder controls, and so on
continuing through the chain of ownership consolidating shares in
every new shell where the link of control remains. But the onus
would be on the company, which stands at the end of that chain
furthest removed from the individual shareholder, required by
statute to report beneficial ownership to determine whether its
shareholders or members owned interests through intermediary
entities. Further, the reporting business entity would have to
determine whether the shareholders controlled the other entities,
which is, as we have seen, a very difficult question and one that
would require the business entity reporting the information to
depend upon the honesty, accuracy, and willingness to reply of
shareholders or members who do not face the same liability for
failure to report that the reporting business entity faces.
Two types of ownership common particularly in other
countries, stock pyramids and cross holdings, could also
significantly complicate the beneficial ownership reporting
approach.4 Ownership pyramids are frequently used to leverage
control through multiple partly-owned intermediaries. In a
pyramid, an investor might hold a twenty-five percent interest in
an entity that holds a twenty-five percent interest in another entity,
which itself holds a twenty-five percent interest in another entity,
etc. Each entity along the pyramid is also owned by other
investors, and the owner at the top of the pyramid maintains
effective control over all of the companies in the pyramid despite
having an ever decreasing actual interest in all of the companies
along the pyramid. 50 A company reporting beneficial ownership
would be placed in the difficult position of trying to determine
whether the entities owning an interest in it were themselves
controlled through a pyramid structure. As such, the cost in time
and effort to comply with the beneficial ownership reporting
49. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman & George G. Triantis,
Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and
Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash Flow Rights 4-6 (Harvard Law
School Olin Discussion Paper, Paper No. 249, 1999), available at http://
ssm.com/abstract=- 147590.
50. Id.
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requirement could be tremendous, and that is assuming that the
beneficial owners of the business entities accurately represented
their identifying information to the reporting business entity.
Another difficultly lies where incidences of cross-holdings are
considered, either simple cross-holdings or cross-holdings through
a combination with pyramid holdings. Cross-holdings occur where
entities hold ownership in each other.51 For some firms, this serves
to reinforce their control. Company A will hold a large stake in
Company B, and Company B can hold a large stake in Company
A, and each could agree to implicitly support the other in votes put
to the shareholders.
A variety of alternative methods using game theory or matrix
theory have been considered as methods to consolidate
shareholders into groups in order to estimate control in firms with
52cross-holdings or with pyramidal structures. But there is still a
vigorous debate among these theories, and it would be inadvisable
to compel small businesses to use game theory to determine their
compliance. That is not the sort of inquiry that easily lends itself to
a simple state compliance reporting form filled out by, for
example, a small business owner.
If the beneficial ownership reporting approach takes a simple
minimum ownership approach, such as a requirement that all
owners with a three percent interest or greater are required to
report their ownership, it would be a very easy system to subvert.
For example, assume there are five companies, A-E, and each
owns twenty-five percent of the other four. Now introduce a
shareholder who has a negligible percentage of company A, say
one percent. At that point, he has control of all five companies,
despite the fact that he only owns one percent of the shares of one
of the companies. That one shareholder actually can use the 1%
interest in one company to control all of the shares that each
individual company actually votes. If you were to appropriately
consolidate that one shareholder's holdings you would see he
effectively holds, through the holding companies by way of a
combination of pyramid and cross-holdings, an effective 100%
interest in all companies, but a simple count of each individual
company's shareholders would not make his controlling interest
apparent. As such, cross-holdings and pyramid holdings could be
easily used to subvert any hard line minimum percentage used to
define control.
51. Id.
52. See Marc Levy, Control in Pyramidal Structures (Centre Emile Bernheim
Research Inst. in Mgmt. Scis., Working Paper No. 06/023, 2006), available at
http://www.solvay.edu/EN/Research/Bemheim/documents/wp06023.pdf.
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The final twist is that actual ownership of equity is completely
unnecessary for control of a business entity. This is true for
corporations, but it is even more accurate for LLCs, which leave
open a wider space for creativity in designing ownership and
interest structures. For instance, compliance with the Levin Bill
might require a practical consideration of any special contractual
powers that shareholders or the board of directors may possess.
Shareholders may have special class voting rights or cumulative
voting rights, the control benefits of which will depend on the
situation and the way shareholders strategically use their special
voting rights.53 The board of directors may have a Section 203
requirement that the board approve purchases of more than twenty
percent of the company's outstanding shares.54 Company charters
are also permitted to include supermajority voting requirements for
some things, such as subsequent changes to the corporate charter.
Some of these factors increase the power of a particular
percentage of stock held. Other contractual provisions may
completely subvert shareholder control, and in other cases the
effect may depend on additional factors. For instance, merely
because no shareholder is able to purchase more than twenty
percent of the stock without board approval does not necessarily
mean that shareholders cannot exercise power against another
shareholder with a large block of shares. Even if shareholders
could not replace the entire board of directors in an election, as
with a staggered board, the fact that shareholders must approve of
mergers and certain other transactions-as well as the requirement
that shareholders must approve of certain new issues of stock
under listing rules of the Exchange Act-may maintain
shareholder leverage. These factors may also substantially increase
the power of a particular shareholder.
Options and other convertible securities also present a curious
question for determining control. These represent the potential to
control, but until they are exercised they do not represent actual
control. Debt convertible into voting equity also presents further
uncertainty for compliance with the Levin Bill. Another
complication in administering this approach will be the difficulty of
empty ownership and whether the presence of derivative positions
that alter a shareholder's net equity position should be incorporated
into the calculus.5
5
53. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 151,203 (2006 & Supp. 2010).
54. Id. § 203 (Supp. 2010).
55. See Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Empty Voting and Hidden
(Morphable) Ownership: Taxonomy, Implications, and Reforms, 61 Bus. LAW.
1011 (2006). Though the problem of empty ownership is more relevant for
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Proponents of a beneficial ownership reporting regime argue
that the problems with defining control can be alleviated by
wording the statute broadly to account for effective control rather
than actual ownership, as is evidenced by the vague definition
present in the current text of the Levin Bill.56 But such broad
wording, such as that in the current Levin Bill, would also subject
an exponentially increasing number of individuals and entities to
the ownership reporting requirements. As the Levin Bill is worded
currently, a wide view of the beneficial ownership reporting
requirement could mean that any shareholder, family member of a
shareholder, individual with power of attorney over a shareholder,
accountant regularly employed by the business, lien holder,
bondholder of the company, credit card company or other financial
entity extending credit to the business, and any other individual
who may obtain a legal interest in the company would all be
required to report their beneficial ownership or risk facing the
criminal and civil sanctions that have been contemplated under the
beneficial ownership reporting regime.
57
C. Difficulties in Determining "Beneficial Owner"
The firmest pushback against the Levin Bill has been regarding
its definition of "beneficial owner" as being overly vague and
overly comprehensive. This is, therefore, the section of the Bill
most likely to be the subject of eventual compromise. However,
even if the section omits its vague references to control and applies
only to equity owners, it could still present numerous difficulties in
execution.
Trading ownership shares of entities covered by the Bill could
take place frequently, and the owners need not necessarily notify
the filing entities of the change. Further, as beneficial ownership
status changes hands involuntarily, including through settlement of
an estate at death, seizure of securities put up as collateral to a
creditor, or divorce proceedings, beneficial ownership status can
remain uncertain for extended periods of time. Thus, as a result of
the inherent uncertainty in determining beneficial ownership,
questions involving publicly traded securities, which are not covered by the
Levin Bill, empty ownership is just as feasible for privately held entities.
56. See S. 569, 111 th Cong. (2009).
57. See Business Formation and Financial Crime: Finding a Legislative
Solution: Hearing on S. 569 Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and
Governmental Affairs, 111 th Cong. 5 (2009) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 569,
Kellogg Testimony] (statement of David H. Kellogg, CEO, Solers, Inc.).
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entities can become non-compliant with the reporting requirements
of the Levin Bill despite their expensive efforts to the contrary.
The beneficial ownership approach could be easily contracted
around through methods that are perfectly valid commercial
practices. For instance, someone forming a business entity who did
not want to report his ownership could form an entity, give
ownership of that entity to another person, but assign that owner's
rights to someone else. He could retain a secured interest in all of
the entity's assets and, through a related debt instrument, require
that the owner's failure to obtain his permission before disposing
of any of the entity assets constitutes an event of default. And if the
beneficial ownership reporting law was enforced such that
individuals could be prosecuted for commercial transactions that
gave creditors significant authority over the operating decisions of
the owners of business entities, then the entire commercial credit
industry could be put in jeopardy.
Another simple method to easily subvert the intent of the
beneficial ownership reporting regime would be to set up a limited
liability entity in what a recent Organization for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD) report on beneficial
ownership refers to as an offshore financial center.58 That entity
could itself serve as the beneficial owner of a U.S. entity. Since the
offshore limited liability entity does not require beneficial
ownership reporting information, the ultimate beneficial owner of
the U.S. business would remain anonymous. Indeed, such an entity
could also easily be formed in a number of other European
countries that do not require beneficial ownership reporting, such
as, among others, Ireland and Great Britain. Further, trusts are
not even formed through a state registry like other business
entities. 60 Therefore, individuals could easily use trusts for illicit
purposes or have trusts form business entities and maintain the
trust as the beneficial owner of the formed entity.
58. See INVESTMENT DIv., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV.,
IDENTIFICATION OF ULTIMATE BENEFICIARY OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF A
CROSS-BORDER INVESTOR 3 (2007), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/8/
41481081.pdf [hereinafter IDENTIFICATION OF ULTIMATE BENEFICIARY
OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL].
59. See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, THIRD MUTUAL EVALUATION
REPORT ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF
TERRORISM: THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
§ 1132, at 234, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/55/29/39064399.pdf [hereinafter
FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING REPORT].
60. IDENTIFICATION OF ULTIMATE BENEFICIARY OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL,
supra note 58, at 4.
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The Treasury Department also urged that a simple concise
definition of "beneficial owner" should be used, not the definition
included in the Levin Bill.61 And yet, the more that the definition
of "beneficial owner" is simplified to make it easier to administer,
the more that those abusing the business entity formation system
will be able to subvert the beneficial ownership reporting
requirements of the Bill.
D. Attorney-Client Privilege
Attorneys typically begin the process of forming the
corporations and LLCs covered by the Levin Bill as part of their
representation of clients engaged in, business transactions.
Attorneys seek to help shield their clients from personal liability
for the operation of their businesses and help their clients create
entities that can afford greater access to capital through credit and
equity injections.
The Levin Bill would expand the definition of "financial
institutions" subject to the Patriot Act to include within that
definition business entity formation agents as well as lawyers
assisting their clients in forming business entities. 62 This would
subject lawyers to the full range of anti-money laundering
surveillance requirements of the Patriot Act, which would
devastate the confidentiality and privilege so key to the trust
implicit in the attorney-client relationship.6 3 Lawyers would have
to file suspicious activity reports about their clients' business
transactions with the Treasury Department. 64 This would be an
unthinkable requirement, for example, for tax lawyers representing
their clients against the Treasury Department. It could severely
limit the essential function of the privilege and confidentiality that
preserves the incentive for clients to offer forthright disclosure to
61. See Business Formation and Financial Crime: Finding a Legislative
Solution: Hearing on S. 569 Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and
Governmental Affairs, 111 th Cong. 9 (2009) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 569,
Cohen Testimony] (statement of David S. Cohen, Assistant Secretary for
Terrorist Financing, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury).
62. See Business Formation and Financial Crime: Finding a Legislative
Solution: Hearing on S. 569 Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and
Governmental Affairs, 111 th Cong. 3 (2009) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 569,
Shepherd Testimony] (statement of Kevin L. Shepherd, Member, Task Force on
Gatekeeper Regulation and the Profession, American Bar Ass'n); see also S.
569, 111 th Cong. (2009).
63. See Hearing on S. 569, Shepherd Testimony, supra note 62.
64. Courtney J. Linn, Redefining The Bank Secrecy Act: Currency
Reporting and the Crime of Structuring, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 407, 513
(2010).
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their lawyers in seeking legal advice that, in the long term,
preserves the rule of law by guiding clients to follow the law.
Since 2003, with the passage of American Bar Association
(ABA) Resolution 104, reiterated in 2008 with the passage of
Resolution 300, the ABA has consistently voiced its opposition to
government-mandated reporting provisions on lawers based on
the low "suspicion" threshold of the Patriot Act. The Patriot
Act's application to the attorney-client relationship would also
require that attorneys be precluded from notifying their clients that
they filed a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR).66 In order to protect
themselves from liability, attorneys would feel pressure to file
SARs on the slightest risk, thus creating a significant conflicts of
interest with all of their clients. 67 This dynamic would be severely
exacerbated by the Levin Bill. The Treasury Department also
expressed opposition to the Levin Bill's requirement that formation
agents be subject to the Bank Secrecy Act and the Patriot Act.68
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) considered the
difficult problem of appropriate attorney response to a suspicion of
a client's money laundering. It did not require attorneys assisting
in business entity creation to collect and become responsible for
beneficial ownership information. Instead it adopted an approach
that advises attorneys to conduct due diligence on their clients only
in the event that a number of risk factors are present, divided into
country risk (whether the client is doing business with a country
that is a known state sponsor of terrorism or terrorism haven),
client risk (whether the lawyer has reason to believe that the client
is engaged in risk activities and whether the lawyer has built a
relationship of trust with the client over a long period of
engagement), and service risk.69
E. Altering the Competitiveness of Small Businesses, U.S.
Businesses, and Privately Held Businesses
The costs of the Levin Bill will be fairly fixed and will apply
only to companies that are not publicly traded. 70 As such, these
costs can be expected to affect large businesses in different ways
from small businesses, and they can also be expected to change the
competitive position of publicly held companies versus privately
65. Id. at 10.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See Hearing on S. 569, Cohen Testimony, supra note 61, at 9.
69. See Nicole M. Healy et. al., U.S. and International Anti-Money
Laundering Developments, 43 INT'L LAW. 795, 799-800 (2009).
70. See S. 569, 11lth Cong. (2009).
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held companies. With the requirement that states provide
beneficial ownership information in response to inquiries from
other nations, it will also stand to benefit State-owned businesses
in foreign countries.
State-controlled foreign companies could abuse this process to
enhance their competitive position against U.S. companies. Even
assuming States are able to solve the problem of maintaining the
privacy of beneficial ownership information, State-owned
enterprises and foreign companies with strong relationships with
their governments could encourage their governments to obtain
private beneficial ownership information with the ostensible goal
of law enforcement objectives, but with the real goal of obtaining
information to enhance their competitive position against U.S.-
owned companies.
Professor Bainbridge of UCLA Law School has also observed
that the Levin Bill will harm the millions of small businesses
exempt from SEC registration trading on the pink sheets.71 Though
the Bill exempts entities registered with the SEC, Professor
Bainbridge recognizes that when shareholders trade in an active
market, an accurate list of their beneficial owners would be nearly
impossible to maintain; 72 therefore, the Bill ignores the fact that
the same issue will be worse for smaller firms exempt from SEC
registration.
Small businesses could face enormous compliance costs in
trying to implement the beneficial ownership bill. The U.K.'s
estimate for compliance costs for the average company is fairly
extreme. A U.K. study estimates that compliance with an annual
beneficial ownership regime would cost the average private
company, at a minimum, nearly 25,000 pounds, or $50,000,
annually. 3 The Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) also admits
that some companies may have to shut down as a result of the
compliance costs that the new reporting requirement would
involve. 74 A requirement to pay such high compliance costs could
71. The Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act,
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2008/05/the-incor
poration-transparency-and-law-enforcement-assistance-act.htm (May 3, 2008,
17:21 PST).
72. Id.
73. HM TREASURY & DEP'T OF TRADE AND INDUS., REGULATORY IMPACT
ASSESSMENT ON DISCLOSURE OF BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP OF UNLISTED
COMPANIES 16 (2002), http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/beneficial condoc.pdf
[hereinafter HM TREASURY, REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT] (the full report
that accompanies this summary document can be found at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/consult-beneficial index.htm).
74. Id. at 17.
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have some fairly extreme consequences for the average small
business.
One business owner testified that, because he uses employee
stock ownership programs to pay his employees, he was concerned
that the public nature of beneficial ownership reporting could
result in competitors using publicly available beneficial ownership
information on his business to recruit his employees.7 5 Also,
because he managed a private company, and publicly traded
companies are likely to be exempt from the beneficial ownership
reporting requirements, he felt it would put his company at a
competitive disadvantage to the publicly traded firms.
7 6
Thus far this Article has focused on the costs of a new business
entity beneficial ownership reporting regime. Cost-benefit analysis
of new legislation and regulation tends to focus on only one side of
the equation, depending on whether the author supports or opposes
the new regulation or rule. The next Section of this paper will,
however, undertake a full analysis of the benefits of the proposed
regulation to determine how they compare against the costs that
this analysis has thus far examined.
IV. LACK OF ABILITY TO STOP TERRORISM FINANCE
A. How the Levin Bill is Unrelated to Substantive Terrorism
Finance
The principal purpose of the Levin Bill is to "ensure that
persons who form corporations in the United States disclose the
beneficial owners of those corporations . . . to assist law
enforcement in detecting, preventing, and punishing terrorism,
money laundering, and other misconduct .... Terrorism finance
must be divided into two distinct parts. First, it involves the flow of
funds from the United States to destinations overseas where it
makes its way into the hands of al-Qaeda or other terrorist
organizations. Second, it involves the flow of funds from overseas
locations to terrorist cells in the United States, where it can fund
the activities of those cells for terrorist acts against the United
States. In both cases, terrorists seek to hide the source, destination,
and purpose of the flow of funds from government enforcement
and intelligence agencies by using the underground banking
system (Hawala), by using camouflaging transactions within the
regulated banking system, or, in the case of terrorist cells, by
75. Hearing on S. 569, Kellogg Testimony, supra note 57, at 5.
76. Id.
77. See S. 569, 11lth Cong. (2009) (preamble).
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avoiding outside financing altogether and self-financing through
criminal or legitimate employment.
78
The opening paragraph of the beneficial ownership reporting
bills in the Senate articulates stopping terrorism finance as the
overriding goal in requiring beneficial ownership reporting. 79 In
part, this Article will consider whether business entities play a role
in terrorism financing, and it ultimately concludes that they do not.
Further, it will show that the objectives of the Levin Bill are
already accomplished by existing regulations-romulgated by the
Treasury Department under the Patriot Act.8 The members and
witnesses at both of the Senate Homeland Security Committee's
hearings on this issue seemed to almost ignore the issue of whether
terrorist financiers would voluntarily self-report information on
beneficial ownership disclosure forms. That issue remains a vital
drawback to the bill, but this Section will set aside that threshold
criticism for the moment to temporarily assume and explore how,
even if criminals could be expected to accurately report their
beneficial ownership onto forms filed with states of incorporation
or formation, the Levin Bill would still be an ineffective tool in
stopping terrorism finance.
In some ways, the notion that government regulation can stop
terrorism finance through beneficial ownership reporting is
inherently misguided. The Hawala banking system, the
underground banking system that is most frequently mentioned in
the context of terrorism finance, operates outside the conventions
of the modem banking system and does not easily lend itself to
regulatory solutions. In response to the Patriot Act and other
banking regulatory initiatives, al-Qaeda affiliates have increasingly
oriented their financing away from the Western world and into
Southeast Asia.81 They have also turned almost exclusively to the
Hawala system.82 Hawala banking is principally an issue for law
enforcement in trying to track the flow of terrorism finance from
developed nations to countries that are terrorist safe havens. The
9/11 Report revealed that, prior to 9/11, al-Qaeda was supported by
78. See JOST & SANHDU, infra note 88; see also THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 14, at 170.
79. See S. 569 (preamble).
80. This Article takes no position on whether the costs of the Patriot Act's
anti-money laundering provisions exceed their benefits. This is a much broader
question than that analyzed in this Article, and many of the benefits of that
particular provision will be evidenced by counterterrorism activities that may
not make their way into the public record.
81. Second Report of the S.C. Res. 1363 Monitoring Group, supra note 19,
at 3-4.
82. Id.
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$30 million in annual donations from charities and imams willing
83to divert funds to al-Qaeda. It also relied on employees at
charities who would siphon funds for al-Qaeda without the
knowledge of their superiors.84 Evidence sug ests that al-Qaeda
transferred money using the Hawala system. In particular, it
relied on Hawala networks in Dubai and Pakistan. Hawaladars
associated with al-Qaeda and charities that supplied money to al-
Qaeda used bank accounts of regulated entities in transmitting
funds from the Hawala system to their ultimate destinations.
8 7
Hawala banks are part of a payment system that originated in
South Asia and operates outside the world of regulated banking.
8 8
Approximately $200 billion is transferred annually around the
world through the Hawala system.89 Most Hawala transactions are
used to process legitimate payments, but it is also a system plagued
by money laundering. Owing to its popularity among
fundamentalist Islamic terrorists, it is specifically a frequent
conduit for terrorism finance. Hawala is in essence a swap
system.90 The typical Hawala dealer offers his services through a
small grocery store or travel agency.91 Hawala banks are most
frequently characterized by extensive networks of trust and family•• 92
relationships. Transfers take place between a network of
hawaladars. 93 Rather than registering asset transfers using
negotiable instruments or central payment clearinghouses,
hawaladars transfer money over the phone by word of mouth.94 To
transfer cash to another country, all one needs to do is contact a
hawaladar in the United States and give them cash; that hawaladar
will contact a colleague in the other country, and the local
83. THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 170.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 171.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. PATRICK M. JOST & HARJIT SINGH SANHDU, INTERPOL GENERAL
SECRETARIAT, THE HAWADA ALTERNATIVE REMITTANCE SYSTEM AND ITS ROLE
IN MONEY LAUNDERING (2000), http://www.interpol.int/Public/FinancialCrime/
MoneyLaundering/Hawala/default.asp.
89. Maryam Razavy, Hawala: An Underground Haven for Terrorists or
Social Phenomenon, 44 CRIM. L. & SOc. CHANGE 277, 288 (2005).
90. ROGER BALLARD, CENTRE FOR APPLIED SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES,
PROCESSES OF CONSOLIDATION AND SETTLEMENT IN REMITTANCE DRIVEN
HAWALA TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN THE UK AND SOUTH ASIA 2 (2004),
http://www.casas.org.uk/papers/pdfpapers/selectctte.pdf.
91. Id. at 3.
92. See JOST & SANHDu, supra note 88.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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hawaladar will give cash from his local safe to the intended
recipient.95 The same process works equally in the other direction.
Hawaladars can build relationships in a couple of ways. One
hawaladar may owe the other money, in which case the remote
payment is his way of repaying the colleague initiating the
transaction (who will then keep the actual cash first delivered).
They may be regular business partners or family members. If a
balance remains in the account, one hawaladar can ship goods to
the other and under- or over-invoice the shipment to balance the
account. Given the ease of balancing accounts through exports and
imports, many hawaladars also sell imported merchandise.
Hawala transmissions out of the U.S. are most likely to reach
India or Pakistan, often by way of Dubai.97 One of the most
common regions serving as an intermediary in Hawala transactions
is Dubai. There are many expatriate Indian and Pakistani workers
living in Dubai, and financial transactions in Dubai are more
lightly controlled than in India and Pakistan.98 The industry is also
divided into retail operators, who actually initiate transactions as
agents of wholesale Hawala operators, who aggregate the
transactions to help net them against each other before settlement
with overseas counterparts.99 These wholesale Hawalas typically
make use of regulated banking accounts. 100 Dubai has also
emerged as a central hub where brokers facilitate transactions
between wholesale hawaladars, and Dubai also serves as a link
between the West and destinations in Pakistan and India. 101 One of
the more frequent reasons cited for U.S. immigrants using the
Hawala system to send money home are the restrictive foreign
exchange controls promulgated by countries like India and
Pakistan. °) 2 There is only one node in the Hawala system in which
business entities come into play, which is that in Dubai the central
exchanges on which Hawala dealers conduct business are entities
registered with the Dubai government. 10 3 These entities would, of
course, not be covered by the U.S. regulations.
There is no evidence to suggest that hawaladars are forming
U.S. business entities to facilitate their transactions. Most
hawaladars operate through owner-operated businesses, which can
95. Id.
96. See id.
97. BALLARD, supra note 90, at 4.
98. See JOST & SANHDU, supra note 88.
99. BALLARD, supra note 90, at 4.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 5.
102. Id. at 7.
103. Id.
880 [Vol. 70
INCORPORATION TRANSPARENCY ACT
operate as sole proprietorships just as easily as incorporated
entities. 104 The concurrent liability doctrine limits the usefulness of
owner-operated shops. 10 5 Hawaladars also would not likely need to
form business entities to protect themselves from liability to
Hawala clients, as such grievances would typically be resolved
through informal means for the same reason that the Hawala client
chose to use an underground bank in the first place. Many of the
clients of Hawala banks are illegal immigrants who, because they
do not have a social security number, could not open a bank
account. 0 6 Hawaladars also do not keep a paper trail of client
transactions, something many clients find useful. 10 7 Hawaladars
seek to keep their overhead low, which is part of the reason
hawaladars are able to offer their clients more competitive
exchange rates than most large national banks, and often operate
with little more than a cell phone and a table in a tea shop. 1
08
Since the nature of Hawala transactions entails violation of
customs and banking regulations, there is a greater risk that
business entities that utilize the system would not accurately report
beneficial ownership information. Even more importantly,
hawaladars would have little reason to incorporate or use LLCs in
their operations. Individuals whose sole income is derived from
hawaladar services would obtain no benefit from entity formation.
Small, unfranchised retail shops that are owner-operated would not
obtain much benefit from incorporation either, as owners of such
shops are likely to be required to cosign any loans they take out
and face significant personal liability for their actions under the
contemporaneous liability they would face as an individual
tortfeasor. Further, there are already numerous sources of
information available to law enforcement for small store operators,
such as liquor licenses, gas distribution permits, business permits
filed with local cities, and tobacco licenses filed with ATF. If those
sources of information are falsified it would seem to indicate that
LLC formation documents would be falsified as well.
One of the prime advantages of using business entities is
liability shielding. The Hawala system operates through bonds of
cultural and familial trust, and, as such, disputes are also resolved
more informally as well. !0 9 Therefore, hawaladars would not
benefit from liability protection in their operations. Furthermore,
104. See JOST& SANHDU, supra note 88.
105. See Karin Schwindt, Comment, Limited Liability Companies: Issues in
Member Liability, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1541, 1548 (1997).
106. See JOST & SANHDU, supra note 88.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. BALLARD, supra note 90, at 3.
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their clients would not seek redress through courts because that
would advertise their participation in unregulated banking
activities. One punishment common in Hawala operations would
be to exclude an operator who is found to have embezzled from
clients or counterparties, and his entire family, from the Hawala
system. 11 According to the governing decrees of various imams,
Islamic law governs the operation of hawaladars, and, where it
conflicts with a nation's law the decree of an Islamic Judge (a
Hakim e sh'aran) governs.111 Hawaladars will experience scant
liability shield advantages from using business entities for their
underground lending activity. To the extent that a member of the
Muslim community has a grievance with his hawaladar, he is not
likely to seek redress through the court system. First, Islamic law
already offers him an avenue for redress." 2 Further, his choice of
unregulated banking, governed as it is by cultural norms, may
indicate a preference for resolving any conflicts with his hawaladar
through the penalty mechanisms of those cultural and family
norms. Finally, if the hawaladar's customers are using the Hawala
system out of an interest in maintaining privacy from government
regulators, either in the U.S. or in their home country, they also
may have a clear preference against using the legal system for
redress against the hawaladar. For these reasons, a hawaladar may
have no interest in using a business entity to conduct his activities.
One of the most powerful reasons to use an LLC or corporation to
conduct business activities is to shield the owners of the business
from personal liability for the tortious and contractual liabilities of
the business entity;" 1but if the relationship with the hawaladar can
be expected to be governed by the decrees of an imam or through
cultural mechanisms, then the limited liability aspect of business
entities offer no benefit to the hawaladar.
If the hawaladar uses a bank account to store cash for his
operation, the Patriot Act can, however, go a long way toward
providing intelligence to determine whether a hawaladar is using it
and, more importantly, whether he is engaged in terrorism
financing. Some Muslim charities have also used legitimate
charities as fronts for transfers to support terrorism. The Patriot
Act can play a tremendous role in the interdiction of terrorism
finance in this respect. The charities operate in the open, using
110. Id. at 12; see also Razavy, supra note 89, at 286.
111. Razavy, supra note 89, at 285.
112. Id,
113. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Limited Liability Companies: A Primer on
Value Creation through Choice of Form (2000), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract=250164.
882 [Vol. 70
INCORPORATION TRANSPARENCY ACT
regulated financial entities. One would expect that donors who
believe that the charity is operating legitimately might become
suspicious if the charity asked for cash donations only. But the
Levin Bill would not provide useful intelligence in this area if
charity operators lied on ownership reporting forms provided by
the incorporating state.
The critiques previously mentioned would apply to the flow of
terrorism finance from the United States and other developed
countries to countries that harbor terrorism. But additional
challenges creep up when trying to use a government filing system
to track the operational financing of terrorist activity as money
flows from terrorist safe havens to countries vulnerable to attack.
This is because that aspect of terrorism finance involves very small
amounts. The 9/11 report estimated that the 9/11 hijackers spent
between $400,000 and $500,000 to conduct their attacks." 4 These
funds came directly from Khaleid Sheikh Mohammed, the
mastermind of the 9/11 attacks. 1 5 There is no evidence to suggest
that subsequent terrorist activity has involved larger sums of
money. That amount of cash could be easily moved from terrorist
safe havens to target nations. A million dollars in cash for instance,
twice the amount used to finance the 9/11 terrorist attacks, weighs
roughly twenty pounds and could be easily checked with luggage,
carried on one's person, or shipped via Fed Ex (though the latter
would involve the risk of detection by cash sniffing dogs). 116 Other
commodities, like diamonds or intellectual property, might weigh
far less. With the simplicity of moving assets to target countries, it
would make little sense for terrorists to use business entities set up
in the United States to move money from terrorist safe havens to
finance ground level operations. It would make little sense to use
the regulated banking system. As such, targeting operational
terrorist finance is left to the work of other disciplines, and a focus
on using state corporate law and banking regulation for this issue is
little more than an expensive distraction (though this Article will
later argue that, between the two, existing banking regulation by
way of the Patriot Act is far more effective than conscription of
state corporate law).
The 9/11 Report's recommendations on terrorist financing are
in favor of continued vigilance. They do not, however, include any
reference to regulating or scrutinizing the use of business entities
in terrorism financing. They also do not include any suggestion
114. THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 169.
115. Id.
116. Federal Reserve Financial Services, Currency and Coin Frequently
Asked Questions, http://www.frbservices.org/help/coinandcurrency.html#a7.
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that beneficial ownership reporting would aid in the anti-terrorism
effort. They also mention that:
[I]f al-Qaeda is replaced by smaller, decentralized terrorist
groups, the premise behind the government's efforts-that
terrorists need a financial support network-may become
outdated. Moreover, some terrorist operations do not rely
on outside sources of money and may be self-funding,
either through legitimate employment or low-level criminal
activity. 117
This low level criminal activity includes petty theft, credit card
fraud, and embezzlement.
1 18
B. The Levin Bill Does Little that the Existing Banking Provisions
of the Patriot Act Do Not Already Accomplish
Much of this Article has offered an analysis of why beneficial
ownership reporting will not be effective in preventing terrorism
finance. It is worth taking some time to show that alternative
measures already in place provide far more useful tools to combat
terrorism finance with more success, while at the same time
minimizing the cost of compliance.
Prior to the enactment of the Patriot Act, anti-money
laundering regulations consisted mostly of banks filing reports
with the Financial Crimes Enforcement network if the transaction
exceeded $10,000; if it was part of a series of related transactions
that seemed to have been structured to avoid the $10,000 reporting
requirement- or if it was a transaction over $5,000 and was deemed
suspicious. 119 In the post-Patriot Act period, the money laundering
rules focused on maintaining an audit trail for transactions that
would not only allow investigators to link transactions to terrorist
activity after the fact, but would actually stop the terrorist activity
in the first place. 20 Anti-money laundering laws were originally
designed to trace the proceeds of criminal activity, but in the wake
of the 9/11 attacks, the focus of anti-money laundering laws shifted
to the prevention of terrorist activity and the criminal acts that
support it.' 2 ' And yet, the Levin Bill does not actually contemplate
117. THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 383.
118. Second Report of the S.C. Res. 1363 Monitoring Group, supra note 19,
at 11.
119. Eric J. Gouvin, Are There Any Checks and Balances on the
Government's Power to Check our Balances? The Fate of Financial Privacy in
the War on Terrorism, 14 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 517, 525 (2005).
120. See id. at 527.
121. Id. at 517.
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collecting large amounts of data and then mining through it for
links to other databases. The Bill contemplates a structure where
the federal government only obtains beneficial ownership
information after the fact when it requests the information. As
such, the Levin Bill is an odd creature to classify as part of the
terrorism interdiction apparatus.
Anti-money laundering regulation originally was focused on
stopping the proceeds of criminal activity, like drug distribution or
tax fraud, from being camouflaged with multiple financial
transactions. 122 That has since given way to a different approach,
focused instead on financial transactions used to support and hide
terrorist activities.123 Nevertheless, law enforcement has not
hesitated to use rules promulgated out of terrorism concerns to
assist them in both criminal and civil investigations of less
importance than stopping terrorism. 124 Within the international
community, anti-money laundering and terrorism finance rules are
promulgated FATF. 125 The FATF convened on October 6, 2001, to
begin developing guidance for member countries on implementing
regulations designed to stop terrorism finance.1
26
Most of the legislative language of the Patriot Act is dedicated
to banking regulation designed to interdict suspicious financial
activity linked to terrorism. Title III of the Patriot Act, titled the
International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-
Terrorism Act of 2001, includes key provisions that dramatically
enhanced the government's tools in surveillance and prosecution of
money laundering. 127 The Patriot Act focuses on the bankers who,
as gatekeepers, have on occasion facilitated criminal money
launderini and who are in the best position to detect suspicious
activity.'2 As such, it does not rely on voluntary reporting by the
122. Id. at 538.
123. Id. at 517.
124. Id. at 535.
125. About the FATF, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,3417,en_32250379_
32236836 1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2010).
126. Gouvin, supra note 119, at 518.
127. See Courtney J. Linn, Redefining the Bank Secrecy Act: Currency
Reporting and the Crime of Structuring, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 407, 408 n.3
(2010) ("Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. III, §§ 311-13, 319(b), 321, 326, 351-54, 358-59, 361-
63, 365-66, 371-72, 115 Stat. 272. The PATRIOT Act amended the BSA to
require financial institutions to establish anti-money laundering programs that
included the development of internal policies, procedures, and controls; the
designation of a compliance officer; an ongoing employee training program; and
an independent audit function to test programs. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) (2006).").
128. Id.
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same individual who might be engaged in underlying illegal
activity supported by the money laundering, something which
forms the core flaw in the beneficial ownership reporting approach
of the Levin Bill. Even if bankers were knowingly colluding in
criminal activity, something which we have not seen thus far in
Patriot Act prosecutions, the internal audit system at a bank could
serve as a backup check on collusion by an individual banker. In
contrast, for the beneficial ownership reporting regime
contemplated by the Levin Bill, only the individual owners and
officers of the LLCs will be reporting. The result is that the Patriot
Act will be highly effective in detecting terrorism finance where
the banker is not knowingly colluding with the money launderer.
But the Levin Bill, by contrast, contemplates a regime in which the
self-reporting agent is the very same individual who is perpetrating
the illegal activity.
One provision of the Patriot Act empowers the Treasury
Secretary to require financial institutions to take steps to identif
beneficial owners of bank accounts held by foreign persons.
Another provision permits the Treasury Secretary to issue
regulations requiring that a bank identify customers whose
transactions flow through accounts with a specific client financial
institution or all client institutions in a specific country. 13 It also
requires financial institutions in the United States to sever all
banking relationships with foreign shell banks, defined as banks
that have no physical presence anywhere. 13 1 Banks must have in
place anti-money laundering procedures that include internal
policies, designation of a compliance officer, employee training,
and an independent audit to test implementation of programs.' 32 It
requires banks to respond to a request by a banking regulator for
information regarding its anti-money launderin 3 compliance
program or a customer's records within 120 hours. The Patriot
Act also requires banks to have in place special due diligence for
all foreign private customers and "enhanced" due diligence for
senior political figures and their immediate families and for banks
from jurisdictions deemed non-cooperative with FATF
guidelines. 134 It also includes a requirement that banks implement
reasonable procedures to identify all customers and consult a
129. Todd Stem, The Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist
Financing Act Of2001, 119 BANKING L.J. 1, 2 (2002).
130. Id. at 2-3.
131. See Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. III, §§ 311-13, 351, 352, 359 and rules
promulgated thereunder.
132. Stem, supra note 129, at 2-3.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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government provided list of known or suspected terrorists. 135 The
definition of "financial institution" stretches widely to include
banks, securities brokers and dealers, investment companies,
insurance companies, travel agencies, car salesmen, and other
institutions.136 The Patriot Act mandates that banks verify the
identity of individuals opening an account and maintain records of
the information used to verify that identity.'
37
Much of the structure of the Patriot Act pushes information
upstream and requires banks to submit reports to the government.
But one of the more powerful, and controversial, elements of the
Patriot Act permits the reverse. The regulations implementing the
Patriot Act further augment its power as an antiterrorism tool. For
example, Section 314(a) permits federal agencies to collect
transaction records that banks are required to maintain by the
Patriot Act. 138 The procedural hurdles for the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN), part of the Treasury Department,
in assisting law enforcement agencies to collect this information
are fairly easy to overcome and do not require a warrant or
subpoena. 139 Instead, the regulation merely requires that FinCen
provide a certification that the subject of the investigation is
reasonably suspected to be engaging in terrorist money laundering
activity. 1
40
The Patriot Act's approach enlists compliance reporting
assistance at the hubs of the economy, within banks where most of
the financial institutions are already subject to regulation and that
specialize in transactions with large groups of customers. The
Levin Bill, by contrast, takes a spokes approach, focusing on
individual business owners who may engage in very few
transactions. Thus, rather than collecting high quality information,
it seeks to amass a high volume of information. In terms of
compliance cost, the Patriot Act also permits economies of scale.
As central hubs in the economy, banks are in a better position to
specialize in compliance. Rather than complying once a year, they
comply with the Patriot Act's provisions every day and can
dedicate departments to compliance activity. They are also in a
better position to detect suspicious financial transactions and are,
in effect, deputized by the Patriot Act as part of a national financial
intelligence network. The owners of individual LLCs set up to
135. Id.
136. 31 U.S.C. § 5312 (2006).
137. Gouvin, supra note 119, at 529.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 531.
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invest in real estate, run local shops and trade offices, or acquire
technology companies do not possess that expertise. And, indeed,
the only beneficial owners of LLCs that matter are those engaged
in criminal activity. This argument may also hold true for the other
financial actors newly included within the definition of "financial
institution" under the Levin Bill.
The other overwhelming difference between the Patriot Act's
approach and the Levin Bill's approach is that while the Patriot
Act arguably raises privacy concerns because of information
sharing with the government, it does not involve information
sharing in the public domain. The Levin Bill's approach, by
contrast, would necessitate sharing beneficial ownership
information with the public. Thus, claims made during hearings on
the Levin Bill that the states would have the option of whether or
not to make beneficial ownership information public are
misleading. Most states would actually be required to amend their
right to know laws, and in many instances actually amend their
constitutions, in order to maintain the confidentiality of beneficial
ownership information.
One benefit to the Patriot Act's approach is that it narrowly
tailors the burden of compliance to two situations where the
benefits of financial intelligence are likely to exceed the costs. The
first is where an objective intermediary, who also faces the
prospect of liability for violations of recordkeeping provisions of
the Patriot Act, sees something that raises suspicion. The second is
a class of transactions with certain banks or countries that are at
higher risk of participation in terrorism. The Levin Bill, on the
other hand, does not tailor compliance at all. As such, the total cost
of compliance is more likely to exceed the benefits of the Bill.
Further, it is more likely that the information overload that results
will present its own distinct problems. To state the problem more
colloquially, the Patriot Act's approach is like looking for a needle
in a haystack by giving metal detectors to farmers, a difficult
approach to be sure. But the Levin Bill's approach looks for the
same needle by asking farmers to file pictures of their haystacks
with the government.
C. An Alternative Explanation for Law Enforcement's Interest
Law enforcement has not hesitated to use rules promulgated
out of terrorism concerns to assist them in both criminal and civil
investigations of less importance than stopping terrorism.
1 41
Indeed, Section 314(a) of the Patriot Act is so powerful that some
141. Id. at 535.
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have suggested that federal authorities will be unable to resist
abusing it to assist in all law enforcement activities that would
justify the attendant risk to financial privacy, not merely those
linked to terrorism.' 42 In "Operation G-Sting," the federal
government used Patriot Act powers to build a case against elected
officials caught u in a bribery scandal involving regulation of
adult strip clubs.1  Publicly available information did not include
any allegation that the targets were engaged in terrorist money
laundering, and, since there is no meaningful check on FinCEN's
certification of suspicion of terrorist activity, the federal
government is likely to continue to use it as such. The same risks
would apply with beneficial ownership reporting, particularly
under the language of the Levin Bill as a previous Section of this
Article explored.
Another issue with the Levin Bill is the leverage it will afford
prosecutors in negotiating settlements with companies. There is
already substantial literature suggesting that prosecutors have too
much leverage over corporate defendants. Piling on regulatory
infractions can give the government tools to prosecute businesses
even when the businesses are able to secure not guilty verdicts on
the underlying offenses that the government is prosecuting.
145
Given the analysis in previous Sections about the difficulty in
determining control and ownership for purposes of compliance
with the Levin Bill, prosecutors may be able to seek indictment for
violation of the Levin Bill in parallel with other indictments. The
same has been true for money laundering prosecutions since the
advent of money laundering regulations, where the underlying
crimes are fairly insignificant but defendants receive large
sentences for financial transactions that by themselves are
innocuous. 146
142. Gouvin, supra note 119, at 534-35
143. Id.
144. See Jeffrey Parker, Rules Without... : Some Critical Reflections on the
Federal Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 397 (1993).
145. Money laundering is, in effect, a derivative crime, characterized by what
would otherwise be perfectly legal activity that becomes illegal because it
relates to other underlying, malum in se offenses. See HM TREASURY,
SUMMARY, infra note 214, at 5.
146. See, e.g., United States v. McNab, 331 F.3d 1228 (llth Cir. 2003).
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V. DRAWBACKS TO THE LEVIN BILL
A. Business Privacy
The Levin Bill purportedly allows states to decide whether to
keep the beneficial ownership information private or make it
publicly available. Many states could require additional resources
to ensure privacy of ownership information, and some could
require amendment to their state constitutions to keep filed
ownership information private. 147 In fact, under the right to know
laws of thirty-eight states, those states would not be permitted to
keep beneficial ownership information of businesses private.
Under public records laws of a majority of states in the U.S., which
are quite broad in their application, beneficial ownership filings of
the type envisioned by the Levin Bill would be deemed public
records that the state secretaries of state would not be permitted to
keep confidential.
148
Costs to business privacy would be significant. Legitimate
businesses have important interests in maintaining the privacy of
the ownership structures that they use to invest in new projects.
This not only impacts purchase prices for target companies, but
also purchase prices for target assets, particularly real estate. High
profile real estate developers may be unable to accumulate and
assemble significant parcels of land needed for major development
projects in an environment where their control of these entities is a
matter of public record. Prices would be bid up based solely on the
identity of the beneficial owner of the acquiring entity, and some
economic development of local communities could ultimately not
occur that otherwise may have been built. In some sense we can
consider the Levin Bill as a redistribution mechanism that
decreases the bargaining leverage of business entities and increases
the bargaining leverage of individuals not negotiating through
business entities in the market for a wide variety of assets.
With trillions of dollars of economic activity tied up in the
eighteen million presently existing U.S. business entities, the
temptation and pressure to infiltrate this information will be
enormous. This will introduce costs to ownership privacy even if
147. See Examining State Business Incorporation Practices: A Discussion of
the Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act: Hearing
on S. 569 Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs,
111 th Cong. 7 (2009) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 569, Haynsworth Testimony]
(statement of Harry J. Haynsworth, Chair, Drafting Commission on Uniform
Law Enforcement Access to Entity Information Act).
148. See generally 76 C.J.S. Records § 113 (2009); see also 37A AM. JUR. 2D
Freedom of Information Acts § 56 (2010).
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states are able to amend their constitutions to counter the
application of the open records requirement to beneficial
ownership reporting. Ultimately, if venture investors can no longer
keep their early stage investment activities confidential, they lose
the incentive to park their capital in such firms. For example, the
next Pixar may find it impossible to develop its product under the
spotlight of public knowledge that someone like Steve Jobs is a
principal investor. 149
Law enforcement personnel assert that the use of corporate
shell companies hampers their ability to investigate corporate
suspects. This argument is limited by the lack of a generally
accepted definition of a "shell company." There are both legitimate
and illegitimate reasons to use corporate forms that have few assets
in corporate mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures, and other
legitimate business activities, and proponents of the Levin Bill
over-generalize in their suspicion of all shell companies. For
instance, shell companies are often used as the acquisition vehicles
whereby one company will purchase an interest in another
company. One reason incorporators may seek to keep beneficial
ownership information private is that the identity of the buyer of a
target company in an acquisition may alter the price charged.
Making public the identity of the owner could also threaten vital
intellectual property or trade secrets for participants' joint
ventures.
Maintaining privacy for beneficial ownership information may
also be vital to executive recruitment. Where equity stock grants in
business entities are used as a form of compensation, publicizing
beneficial ownership information may harm an executive's
financial privacy. It may also be that investors in politically
sensitive projects would want to minimize reactionary public
response to their investments, as where college endowments invest
in forestry projects that some interest groups oppose or a state
pension fund invests in companies overseas.
Some individuals may also use business entities to maintain
their privacy in interactions with banks or the government, while
fulfilling their obligations as taxpayers, without nefarious purpose.
Every year stories surface about government employees who use
their access to financial data for non-work purposes, such as
149. Michael Hirschom, Success Story 2, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 22, 2008.
150. Tim Castelli, Not Guilty By Association: Why the Taint of their Blank
Check Predecessors Should Not Stunt the Growth of Modern Special Purpose
Acquisition Companies, 50 B.C. L. REv. 237 (2009).
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looking up incomes of famous actors or their neighbors. 151
Individuals may also have an interest in keeping their personal
financial information private from employees of their local bank or
savings and loan. Business entities can give taxpayers and bank
customers an opportunity to protect their financial privacy while
fulfilling their obligations to the government or the banks that
serve their financial needs.
A beneficial ownership reporting requirement could also
threaten the anonymity of philanthropic donors. If a donor gave, as
many do, their interest in a business entity as part of a bequest to
some public university or other recipient, it may become
impossible to honor a donor's wish for anonymity, as the change in
beneficial ownership from the donor to the public institution would
show up in publicly available beneficial ownership information.
Information about ownership of business entities can also
indirectly reveal the substance of financial transactions that a firm
may have competitive reasons for keeping private from
competitors, suppliers, employees, creditors, and customers. 52 As
such, revealing the ownership information through the public
domain could alter the negotiating leverage of business entities
with their transaction partners in unintended ways.
B. The Purpose ofAlternative Entities Is Frustrated by the Bill
One of the major drawbacks to the Levin Bill is that it would
limit the freedom of contract approach implicit in many states,
particularly Delaware's approach to LLC and alternative entity
law.153 Delaware has designed its LLC legal regime to facilitate
freedom of contract to allow parties to LLC agreements to arrange
their relations according to their particular needs. 154 One of the
reasons that the LLC entity was created in the first place was to
permit owners of alternative entities (non-corporate entities) to
participate in the management of an enterprise while still
151. See, e.g., Andrea Coombes, IRS employee sentenced for snooping,
MARKETWATCH, Aug. 20, 2008, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/irs-worker-
snooped-on-tax-records-of-almost-200-celebrities.
152. See G. Scott Dowling, Fatal Broadside: The Demise of Caribbean
Offshore Financial Confidentiality Post USA Patriot Act, 17 TRANSNAT'L LAW
259, 268 (2004).
153. Myron T. Steele, Freedom of Contract and Default Contractual Duties
in Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 46 AM.
Bus. L.J. 221-42 (2009).
154. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (2006 & Supp. 2009) ("It
is the policy of this chapter to give the maximum effect to the principle of
freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited liability company
agreements.").
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maintaining limited liability, a feature that was not available for
LLPs. '
LLCs also offer an advantage over corporations in that they do
not mandate particular ownership structures or treatment of distinct
classes of owners in the way that corporations do.' 56 Many LLCs
also permit free assignment of ownership rights and facilitate a
divergence between ownership and assignment of financial
rights. 157 LLC laws also do not mandate a single control method,
unlike corporation statutes, which require annual elections for a
board of directors to manage the company.' 58 As such, they permit
a level of creativity in structuring the rights and duties of LLC
members to each other in the management of the enterprise. A
beneficial ownership reporting requirement could threaten all of
these innovative benefits of the LLC form. As relations are
structured to evade the control element of the beneficial owner
definition, while at the same time operating under the cloud of
uncertainty that the definition leaves open, LLC members will be
restricted in taking advantage of the full benefits that the LLC form
has to offer.
One factor that would complicate determinations of control in
LLCs is that, by default, an LLC is managed by its members rather
than by, as in the corporate form, a board of directors.' 5 9 This
could lead to all members of LLCs being considered, by default, in
control of the LLC for the purpose of applying a control test for
ownership reporting. In the event that an LLC contract opted out of
the default rule, uncertainty would prevail over whether the default
was sufficient to eviscerate control. Complicating this question
even further is the fact that states differ on how much control
members retain by default, so even if the Treasury Department
were to try and anticipate by administrative guidance, it would
have to consider how the myriad of possible contractual provisions
allocating control would change the beneficial ownership
definition under fifty separate LLC statutes.
160
To present a fair picture of how the Levin Bill affects LLC law,
it should be noted that one policy issue that complicates LLC law
would be limited by the beneficial ownership reporting
requirement. Professor Larry Ribstein notes that differences in
155. See Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability Company: A Study
of the Emerging Entity, 47 Bus. LAW. 375, 385 (1992).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 389.
158. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (Supp. 2010).
159. See RIBsTEIN, UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ENTITms 364 (2d ed. 2000)
[hereinafter RIBSTEIN, UNINCORPORATED BusINESS ENTms].
160. Id. at 365.
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state statutes regarding the authority of LLC members to bind the
LLC make it difficult for third parties to reliably predict whether
an LLC member has such authority.' 6 1 He also notes that, even if a
statute controls whether a member or a manager has the authority
to bind a firm, and to what degree, there is no requirement that
LLCs disclose their beneficial owners publicly.' 62 The Levin Bill
would minimize this issue. And yet, there are far simpler ways to
address the problem of whether LLC members or managers can
bind the LLC, and to what extent.1
63
The Levin Bill would also complicate the operation of voting
trusts, which are agreements whereby members reallocate power
temporarily by granting the right to vote their interests to a
trustee.' 64 Trustees may be cautious about undertaking the voting
responsibility out of concerns about beneficial ownership reporting
compliance.
In the event that states have to include reporting of beneficial
ownership as a prerequisite to LLC formation, the uncertainty
implicit in the beneficial ownership definition assumes particular
import. If the formalities of business formation are not met, which
could include proper reporting of beneficial owners, the business
entity is disallowed and treated like a general partnership with its
attendant personal liability for the business' liabilities.'
65
The series LLC is an innovation of the Delaware LLC statute
that permits relief from veil-piercing liability by allowing LLCs to
designate a series of members, managers, or LLC interests with
separate rights, powers, or duties with respect to specified property
or obligations or profits associated with that property.166 This
business form, the most recent innovation at the forefront of
alternative entity evolution, would seem nearly imossible to fit
within a beneficial ownership reporting framework. 1 6 The issues
with determining beneficial ownership and control compliance
could become nearly impossible as series LLC interests become
increasingly complex. Indeed, the Levin Bill could kill the series
LLC altogether.
161. Id. at 365-66.
162. Id. at 366.
163. Id. For instance, Professor Ribstein notes that clear drafting in the LLC
agreement, combined with a requirement to file that agreement, may remedy
much of the problem.
164. Id. at 368.
165. Seeid. at344.
166. Christopher McLoon & Margaret Callaghan, The Dangerous Charm of
the Series LLC, 24 ME. B.J. 226, 229 (2009)
167. See RIBSTEIN, UNINCORPORATED BuSiNESs ENTITLES, supra note 159,
at 346.
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A member's status as a manager in an LLC, and his attendant
control over the entity's affairs, can affect his fiduciary duty
liability to the other members of the LLC (assuming the entity has
not contracted around it or the state of formation does not permit
contractual opt-out). 168 As such, if the beneficial ownership
requirements were triggered upon achieving control, then a firm's
decision to file certain beneficial ownership information could be
taken as evidence that the member whose information was filed
was in control of the entity; thus, such reporting could leave that
member with significant risk of liability.
States also differ on the types of events, including bankruptcy
and death, that institute disassociation of the LLC and could
possibly result in immediate dissolution of the LLC. 169 If the
Treasury's definition of "LLC dissolution" and the state's
definition are different, it could also result in problems with the
obligation to report beneficial ownership.
The Levin Bill could also make it difficult for non-profit
entities to own an interest in LLCs, as non-profits do not have an
identifiable owner. Non-profits often own an interest in LLCs to
facilitate their mission, as, for instance, where non-profit hospitals
partner with for-profit medical services companies to jointly
provide medical services. 170 But if the LLC is unable to identify its
non-profit owner, owing to the fact that beneficial ownership is not
a term that fits properly within the non-profit organization context,
it may make it difficult for the LLC to give an equity interest to a
non-profit organization. This could also hold true for LLCs given
as donations to charitable or non-profit institutions. If, for instance,
an oil mogul donated an LLC owning his royalty rights to a
university, and it made sense for transactional planning purposes to
make the university a member of the LLC, it could be difficult for
the LLC to comply with the beneficial ownership reporting rule
because the university has no beneficial owner.
The Levin Bill also poses serious risks to the ongoing evolution
of alternative business entities. One such issue is the use of LLCs
for non-profit purposes. For example, LLCs have been used to
accomplish, through contractual means, the objectives of marriage,
such that same sex-couples have pooled their assets by way of
forming LLCs together. 17 1 Those couples may have a privacy
objection to having their association made a part of public record.
168. Id. at 372.
169. Id. at 373-74.
170. See 2 RIBsTEIN & KEATINGE ON LLCs § 22.3, at 22-28 (2d ed. 2008).
171. See RiBSTEIN, UNINCORPORATED BUsINEss ENTITIES, supra note 159, at
404.
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C. Constitutionality Challenges
The Levin Bill directly implicates the allocation of power
between the states and the federal government. As such,
constitutional challenge to the Bill can be expected depending on the
types of provisions that eventually make their way into the Bill.
In Whalen v. Roe, the United States Supreme Court heard a
challenge to a New York state law requiring physicians to file
copies of controlled substance prescriptions with the state, which
were then kept with the state health department. 172 Public
disclosure of the patient's identity was prohibited, and access to
the files was confined to a limited number of Health Department
personnel. 173 A challenge was instituted based on the defendant's
right to privacy in his prescription information. 1
74
The Court took note of the fact that there were no other
available avenues for the Health Department to prevent unlawful
prescription of narcotics. 175 The Court also noted that extensive
steps were taken to ensure that patients' information was not
revealed to the public, including locked fences and special security
measures. 176 While recognizing the importance of privacy
concerns, the Court found that there was no reason to suggest that
the state's security measures would result in public dissemination
of private patient information. 177 In contrast, the Levin Bill would
result in precisely the opposite result; it would result in the wide
dissemination of private ownership information.
Another relevant constitutional issue that may arise could
involve the Fifth Amendment rights of LLC owners. Though the
entities themselves will not enjoy Fifth Amendment protection
against self-incrimination, 178 the owners of the entities subject to
172. 429 U.S. 589, 589 (1977).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 592. The Chairman of the T.S.C. summarized its findings:
Law enforcement officials in both California and Illinois have been
consulted in considerable depth about the use of multiple prescriptions,
since they have been using them for a considerable period of time.
They indicate to us that they are not only a useful adjunct to the proper
identification of culpable professional and unscrupulous drug abusers,
but that they also give a reliable statistical indication of the pattern of
drug flow throughout their states: information sorely needed in this
state to stem the tide of diversion of lawfully manufactured controlled
substances.
Id. n.6.
176. Id. at 594.
177. Id. at 601-02.
178. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
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the act may be forced to reveal ownership information that could
be used against them in a criminal prosecution. A statute requiring
the maintenance of beneficial ownership information could operate
in conjunction with the "required records doctrine" to eliminate
Fifth Amendment protection for personal ownership
information.
79
Yet another constitutional issue implicated by the Levin Bill
involves state sovereignty. In Printz v. U.S., the Supreme Court
invalidated provisions of the Brady Bill that imposed mandatory
regulatory requirements on local law enforcement. 180 The Brady
Bill required chief law enforcement officers, to whom a transferor
of a handgun provided notice of transfer, to make reasonable
efforts to ascertain within five business days whether receipt or
possession would be in violation of the law; such reasonable
efforts required research in whatever state and local record-keeping
systems were available and research in a national system
designated by the United States Attorney General. 181 The Court
noted that the Brady Bill did not require the state law enforcement
officers to prevent illegal sales.1 82 While the opinion recognized
that the federal government has the right to condition federal
expenditures on a state's implementation of certain regulations,
83
in this case the Levin Bill does not so condition federal
expenditures. While the Levin Bill mentions that states can use
already appropriated homeland security funding to implement this
mandate, it does not condition the expenditure on that funding.
The Court in Printz did note a duty on the part of states and
their officials to the federal government to enact, enforce, and
interpret state law in such fashion so as not to obstruct the
operation of federal law; all state actions constituting such
obstruction, even legislative acts, are invalid. 184 However, with the
Levin Bill, state officials are not interpreting state law in such a
way as to negate federal law; the only way they could do so would
be to fail to follow the affirmative requirement to act in much the
same way that local sheriffs in Printz were negating the operation
of state law by failing to follow the requirements of the invalidated
Brady Bill. The Brady Bill in Printz included a penalty of up to a
179. See Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1968) (describing the
components of the required records doctrine established in Shapiro v. United
States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948)).
180. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
181. Id. at 902 (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 922 (1993)).
182. Printz, 521 U.S. at 904.
183. Id. at 960-61.
184. Id. at 913 (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984))
(federal preemption of conflicting state law).
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year in prison for anyone failing to comply with the law, which
would presumably have a plied to law enforcement officers
covered by the Brady Bill.'8  Justice Scalia articulated the Court's
interpretation of state sovereignty succinctly: "The Federal
Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a
federal regulatory program.' ' 186 Printz is often cited, but it was not
the first time that the Supreme Court determined that federal
compulsion of state regulation through affirmative requirements is
unconstitutional. 
18 7
In part, the Court's reasoning was articulated through an
understanding of the Framers' experience with the failure of the
Articles of Confederation, which was due principally to the fact
that they contemplated exercise of federal power through the
states.'W The Court also firmly rested on the principle that the
185. Paul Finkelman, The Roots of Printz, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1399 (2004).
186. Printz, 521 U.S. at 926.
187. Justice Scalia explained further:
In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc.
and FERC v. Mississippi, we sustained statutes against constitutional
challenge only after assuring ourselves that they did not require the
states to enforce federal law. In Hodel we cited the lower court cases in
EPA v. Brown, but concluded that the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977 did not present the problem they raised
because it merely made compliance with federal standards a
precondition to continued state regulation in an otherwise preempted
field. In FERC, we construed the most troubling provisions of the
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 to contain only the
"command" that state agencies "consider" federal standards, and again
only as a precondition to continued state regulation of an otherwise
preempted field. We warned that "this Court never has sanctioned
explicitly a federal command to the States to promulgate and enforce
laws and regulations."
Id. at 925-26 (internal citations omitted).
188. Justice Scalia emphasized the necessity of state independence from
direct federal compulsion to remedy perceived drawbacks to the Articles of
Confederation as he notes:
The Framers' experience under the Articles of Confederation had
persuaded them that using the states as the instruments of federal
governance was both ineffectual and provocative of federal-state
conflict. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton).
Preservation of the states as independent political entities being the
price of union, and '[t]he practicality of making laws, with coercive
sanctions, for the States as political bodies' having been, in Madison's
words, "exploded on all hands," 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 9 (M. Farrand ed., 1911), the Framers rejected
the concept of a central government that would act upon and through
the states and instead designed a system in which the state and federal
governments would exercise concurrent authority over the people ....
Id. at 919-20.
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federal government and the states are required by the Constitution
to have independent accountability to their citizenry. 189 These two
independent lines of accountability exist so that each government
serves as a check on the prospect of tyranny by the other.
The Court in Printz also observed that delegation of executive
authority to the states would result in a violation of separation of
powers." In part, this was a consequence of the fact that the
Brady Bill left local sheriffs to determine whether the handgun
purchasers were in compliance with the Brady Bill. 19' In this
instance, the Levin Bill purports to be more straightforward than
the Brady Bill, reading simply like an information collection
requirement that does not require the exercise of executive
authority in determining compliance. And yet, the Levin Bill
makes precisely the same constitutional mistake that brought down
the state mandate provisions of the Brady Bill. As analyzed in
other Sections of this Article, however, it is clear that the
uncertainties in the definitions of "beneficial owner" or "control"
would in fact require states to exercise federal executive authority
in determining whether an LLC is in compliance with the
requirements of the Levin Bill. Therefore, state secretaries of state,
who are state level executive branch officials, would be co-opted
by the federal government to serve a federal regulatory role just as
local sheriffs were forced to serve the same role in the invalidated
provisions of the Brady Bill.
189. Justice Scalia also emphasized the importance of dual governments as
key to maintaining accountability to citizens as he wrote:
The great innovation of this design was that "our citizens would have
two political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from
incursion by the other"-"a legal system unprecedented in form and
design, establishing two orders of government, each with its own direct
relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and
obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it."
Id. at 920 (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838
(1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the
people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the
portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate
departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people.
The different governments will control each other, at the same time that
each will be controlled by itself THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323
(James Madison).
Id. at 922.
190. See id. at 922-23.
191. See id. at 927-28.
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VI. ONGOING DEBATE OVER THE LEVIN BILL
A. Responding to the Bill's Proponents
One argument used by proponents of the Levin Bill is that it
maintains United States compliance with international agreements
on anti-money laundering, particularly Recommendation 33 of
FATF (of which the United States is a member).192 As evidence of
the nation's supposed noncompliance, the Levin Bill portrays the
U.S. as out of step with European practices. Finding No. 10 of the
Bill states that "[i]n contrast to practices in the United States, all
countries in the European Union are required to identify the
beneficial owners of the corporations they form.' 93 But contrary
to the Bill's Finding No. 10, not "all" European Union countries
require the disclosure of beneficial ownership when forming
corporations. In fact, the overwhelming majority do not, including
the larger European Union member states such as Germany, Italy,
Spain, France, Ireland, and Great Britain. 194 Moreover, some of
these countries even lack the legal concept of beneficial
ownership, 195 let alone one as opaque and ambiguous as the
definition of "beneficial owner" in the Levin Bill.
196
At least one European Union country, the United Kingdom,
considered a beneficial ownership disclosure system similar to
what the Levin Bill mandates, with an almost identical definition
of "beneficial owner" as the Levin Bill. 197 According to the
FATF's evaluation, the United Kingdom engaged consultants in
2002 to produce a report on the proposed system and then
subjected it to public consultation. r98 The conclusion of this
192. ATF's Recommendation 33 states that "[c]ountries should ensure that there
is adequate, accurate and timely information on the beneficial ownership and control
of legal persons that can be obtained or accessed in a timely fashion by competent
authorities." See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, THE FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS
11 (2003), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/26/2789371.pdf
193. See S. 569, 11 1th Cong., § 2(10) (2009).
194. Other European Union countries without a beneficial ownership
disclosure requirement upon incorporation include: Austria, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Luxembourg, Portugal, Romania,
Slovakia, Sweden, as well as the non-European Union countries of Norway,
Switzerland, and Canada.
195. These countries are Finland, Hungary, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, and
Switzerland.
196. See S. 569, § 2009(e)(1).
197. See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, ANTI-MoNEY LAUNDERING
REPORT, supra note 59, § 1132, at 234.
198. Id.
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process, with respect to the proposed beneficial ownership
disclosure system, was:
[T]hat there were significant disadvantages and no clear
benefits, particularly when taking into account the costs of
introducing such measures. Reasons included:
" disclosure of beneficial ownership would add no
information of benefit . .. . Those engaged in criminal
activities would not provide true information about the
beneficial owners;
" disclosure would result in misleading information being
included on the register. Because beneficial ownership is,
as a matter of law, impossible to define precisely, any
information requirement designed to require by law
disclosure would have to be complex and detailed. Many
ordinary, innocent shareholders would be unable to
understand it or comply with it.
199
The United Kingdom authorities concluded that their current
entity formation regime, which did not require beneficial
ownership disclosure, provided investigators with as much
information as could any disclosure regime, and that adding a
beneficial ownership disclosure requirement "would be harmful to
investigations through the resulting misleading information
provided by both criminal and innocent shareholders., 20 0 The
DOJ's testimony in support of the Levin Bill ultimately offered up
only one piece of evidence in support of the fact that successful
money laundering prosecutions are actually hindered by the failure
to obtain beneficial ownership information. When questioned
about whether a lack of information about a U.S. shell company
had hindered one of their investigations, "nearly all of a 75-person
audience consisting of federal investigators and prosecutors from
throughout the country responded that it had."2 0' These
investigations were based on review of SARs filed with the
Treasury Department.
20 2
The DOJ's analysis in this respect suffers from two flaws.
First, it presumes that SARs are indicators of suspicious activity.
199. Id.
200. Id. § 1133, at 234.
201. Examining State Business Incorporation Practices: A Discussion of the
Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act: Hearing on
S. 569 Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 111th
Cong. 3 (2009) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 569, Calvery Testimony] (statement
of Jennifer Shasky Calvery, Senior Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General,
U.S. Dep't of Justice).
202. Id.
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But the Patriot Act requires filing of SARs in a broad array of
circumstances, and banks have strict liability for failure to file
SARs, if the Treasury Department later determines they were
necessary, virtually no liability for filing them. 20 3 As a result,
banks have developed procedures that inundate the Treasury
Department with SARs. Even if it is accepted that the initial
investigations and SAR reviews referenced by the DOJ were likely
indicators of illegal activity, that does not mean that having a
voluntary reporting requirement in place would solve the problem.
The second major flaw in the DOJ's analysis is that it fails to
appreciate that business entities already have a requirement to
maintain a link of communication with state incorporating bodies.
All states require that a business entity maintain a registered agent
or a person or entity that will serve as agent for service of process
within the state.20 4 Many registered agents offer their services to
multiple business entities. Registered agents are required by state
business entity statutes to do the following:
Accept service of process and other communications
directed to the limited liability companies and foreign
limited liability companies for which it serves as registered
agent and forward same to the limited liability company or
foreign limited liability company to which the service or
communication is directed; and ... Forward to the limited
liability companies and foreign limited liability companies
for which it serves as registered agent the statement for the
annual tax described in § 18-1107 of this title or an
electronic notification of same in a form satisfactory to the
Secretary of State.20 5
Business formation statutes in other states mirror this Delaware
statute regarding LLC formation. As a result, formation agents
require that their clients maintain current contact information with
them. So the DOJ seems to be assuming that it would be unable to
submit a subpoena to the registered agent to obtain the forwarding
information of the LLC or other business entity or have that
subpoena forwarded to the investigated entity. If this is, then it
would stand to reason that the beneficial owners of entities used
for nefarious purposes, who are already providing their registered
agents with false information in violation of business entity
statutes, would also provide false beneficial ownership information
203. See Gouvin, supra note 119, at 526 n.60.
204. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 131 (2006).
205. See Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §
18-104(e)(3)-(4) (Supp. 2010).
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to the same registered agents. Indeed, if the business entities used
for illegal activities have provided their registered agents with false
contact information, it would stand to reason that any beneficial
ownership reporting forms forwarded by the registered agent
would end up lost in the mail.
B. What Other Countries Have Done
The beneficial ownership reporting requirement runs counter to
the practices of Canada, Mexico, Japan, and China.20 6 Only one
member state in the FATF, Italy, actually requires reporting of
beneficial ownership information. 7 The Levin Bill's assertion that
the U.S. is non-compliant with its FATF requirements is directly
refuted by a 2007 OECD report on beneficial ownership, which
maintains that:
[S]ome jurisdictions require extensive disclosure of
beneficial ownership and control information up front at the
formation stage and some impose an obligation to update
such information when changes occur. Other jurisdictions,
the majority, find they are able to rely on their compulsive
power, court-ordered subpoenas and other legal measures
to penetrate the legal entity in order to identify the
beneficial owners when necessary.
20 8
In the United Kingdom, the process of incorporating financial
entities is distinctly different from the United States. First, business
entities are formed by registering with a bureau called Companies
House, a subdivision of Her Majesty's Treasury ("HM
Treasury").20 9 HM Treasury conducted a regulatory impact study on
the prospect of beneficial ownership reporting in 2002 that
generated some conclusions useful for the present analysis.210 The
HM Treasury Report opened with an acknowledgement that "[t]here
is a balance to be struck between the benefits of a new disclosure
regime and the costs imposed on the vast majority of companies that
are not involved in any sort of crime."21' It stated that:
206. See Hearing on S. 569, Shepherd Testimony, supra note 62, at 3.
207. Hearing on S. 569, Marshall Testimony, supra note 13, at 6.
208. See IDENTIFICATION OF ULTIMATE BENEFICIARY OWNERSHIP AND
CONTROL, supra note 58, at 7.
209. Companies House, Framework Document, http://www.companieshouse
.gov.uk/about/corporateDocuments/frameworkDocument.pdf (last visited Mar.
21, 2010).
210. See HM TREASURY, REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 73.
211. Id.§ 5.1.
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[T]hose who control assets of a company set up for
criminal purposes may be careful to avoid any beneficial
ownership of the company's shares .... [C]ontrollers may
be shareholders ... creditors ... shadow directors ... or a
third party controllin the company by blackmail,
extortion, or coercion. 2 1If
The HM Treasury Report also admitted that "it is a given that any
person who owns or controls a company for criminal purposes will
not comply with any self-certification requirement to disclose
details of ownership or control.,
213
The U.K. cost impact assessment is far more comprehensive
than the cursory attention paid to cost-benefit analysis by the
United States. The U.K. assessment considered that not only was
precisely defining "beneficial ownership" and "control" a difficult
issue for creating an entity ownership regime, but that such a
regime would need to come up with simple definitions that the
ordinary layman could understand for use in simple reporting
forms.2
14
One approach that the U.K. initially considered in determining
who must register as beneficial owners was to require registration
from all owners with at least three percent ownership.215 However,
this fails to take into account the fact that a business entity
governing document can give full and complete governing power
to a .0001% owner and no control to anyone else. Individuals
intent on abusing the formation system could easily use the
freedom of contract principles underlying alternative entity
formation to work around hard rules, if they seek to comply with
them at all. The U.K.'s RIA also targets professional
intermediaries, as does the U.S. approach, by listing as an
advantage the ability to threaten entity formation intermediaries
with long prison sentences. 216 This also threatens the sanctity of
the attorney-client relationship and goes far beyond prosecuting
attorneys who assist their clients in breaking the law; rather, it
forces attorneys to affirmatively investigate their clients for
violations of law.
212. Id.
213. Id. § 7.1.
214. HM TREASURY & DEP'T OF TRADE AND INDUS., REGULATORY IMPACT
ASSESSMENT ON DISCLOSURE OF BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP OF UNLISTED
COMPANIES: SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES 4 (2002), http://www.hm-treasury.gov.
uk/d/beneficial condoc.pdf [hereinafter HM TREASURY, SUMMARY].
215. Id. at 6.
216. Id. at 10.
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The OECD Report on the Misuse of Corporate Vehicles for
Illicit Purposes calls for timely and accurate beneficial ownership
information to be made available by one of three alternative
measures. 2  They include up front disclosure, disclosure byintermediaries, or use of an investigative system.
C. Alternative Approaches
A new discussion draft currently being considered by the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Development
("Banking Draft") seeks to create a compromise beneficial
ownership rule that explicitly accounts for some of these
drawbacks to the Levin Bill. The Banking Draft reads directly that
the Treasury Department shall have the authority to issue a
beneficial ownership regulation that complies with the following
restrictions:
The regulations issued by the Secretary under subsection
(b) shall
(1) be based on recommendation 33 of the "Forty
Recommendations," adopted by the Plenary of the
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering in June
2003;
(2) contribute to the ability of law enforcement authorities
to obtain adequate, accurate, and timely information
relating to the beneficial ownership and control of legal
persons;
(3) improve the efforts of the Federal Government to stop
illicit financial activity and disrupt terrorist networks;
(4) not impose undue financial burdens on States and
businesses that operate lawfully; and
(5) not impair the attorney-client privilege in Federal or
State court or create conflicts between attorneys and
clients;
(6) describe in reasonable detail the provisions that must be
in force for a State to be considered in compliance with this
section and eligible for grants or other financial assistance
to help bring it in compliance with this section;
(7) prescribe appropriate penalties for noncompliance of
any person who affects interstate or foreign commerce by
knowingly providing, or attempting to provide, false
information, or intentionally failing to provide information,
217. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, THE MISUSE OF CORPORATE
VEHICLES, INCLUDING TRUST AND COMPANY SERVICE PROVIDERS (2006).
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that is required to be provided in compliance with the
regulations issued under subsection (b), or by intentionally
failing to perform any action that is required to be
performed under those laws.218
As the language of the Banking Draft presently reads, it does
not affirmatively require creation of a beneficial ownership or
controlling owner registry. Moreover, it does not necessarily
guarantee that the Treasury Department will not use the enabling
legislation to craft, by regulation, the same type of beneficial
ownership reporting structure envisioned by the Levin Bill. The
restrictions in the Banking Draft language that prohibit the
Treasury Department from crafting a rule that does "not impose
undue financial burdens on States and businesses that operate
lawfully," in particular, seems to be too vague to permit
subsequent legal challenge if the Treasury Department decided to
use the Banking Draft enabling legislation to enact a regime
identical to that contemplated by the Levin Bill. Furthermore, even
if the Treasury Department drafted regulations that comported with
the Banking Draft, a subsequent appointee would remain free to
change the language toward a Levin Bill-based approach. As such,
the costs and drawbacks to the Levin Bill could just as easily apply
to the Banking Draft.
In response to the Levin Bill, the Uniform Law Commission
(ULC) drafted an alternative mechanism to address concerns about
transparency and enforcement. The Uniform Law Enforcement
Access to Entity Information Act (the "Uniform Act") presents a
less costly method to achieve the same outcome intended by the
Levin Bill.219
Features of the Uniform Act that differ from the Levin Bill
include:
* The Uniform Act only applies to filing entities with fewer
than fifty owners. 22 This will limit compliance for larger
entities that will find beneficial ownership tracking overly
costly. The assumption underlying this provision is that the
types of entities used for financial fraud and terrorism
financing tend to have fewer owners.
* The Uniform Act applies to all business entities, rather than
merely entities created after the Act's enactment (an
218. S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Dev., Discussion on
Beneficial Ownership Reporting (draft on file with the author).
219. UNIF. LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO ENTITY INFORMATION ACT
(Tentative Draft 2009).
220. Id. at 1.
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approach distinct from a prior version of the Levin Bill).22'
This will prevent criminals from using old entities to escape
reporting requirements.
The Uniform Act requires reporting entities to file with their
state secretaries of state the name and business address of a
responsible individual, which must be a person participating
in the management and control of a business, who agrees to
furnish information on beneficial ownership to law
enforcement upon issuance of a subpoena. 222 Requiring the
responsible individual at the company to maintain
ownership records rather than keeping them on file with the
state will allow legitimate companies to maintain their
financial privacy. It will also ensure that the costs of
compliance are borne only by the entities that are targets of
law enforcement investigation. One significant argument
made by the Levin Bill's proponents is that when law
enforcement comes to an impasse, having at least one
individual they can pressure to find the next link in the
investigative trail would be beneficial.223 This objective can
be accomplished at less cost through the responsible person
provision in the ULC's recommended alternative. 224
One argument that proponents of the Levin Bill have raised is
that the ULC's required designation of a responsible individual at a
company, who would serve as the custodian of beneficial
ownership information until required to turn it over by subpoena,
would give that individual forewarning of the ongoing
investigation and then -ive him an opportunity to destroy evidence
of the entity's crimes. 225 And yet, that argument against the ULC
proposal cuts even more strongly against the Levin Bill itself. If
the businesses targeted by the Levin Bill are in fact willing to
commit obstruction of justice, a much stronger offense than failure
to comply with the Levin Bill, then the businesses would be even
more likely to misstate beneficial ownership on forms forwarded to
states of incorporation.
Testimony from the DOJ referenced a case in which an arms
smuggler used U.S. shell companies for illegal arms trafficking.226
The DOJ also referenced cases in which drug smugglers used U.S.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 11.
223. See Hearing on S. 569, Ayala Testimony, supra note 15, at 7.
224. See generally Hearing on S. 569, Haynsworth Testimony, supra note
147, at 6.
225. Hearing on S. 569, Kaufmann Testimony, supra note 2, at 3.
226. Hearing on S. 569, Calvery Testimony, supra note 201, at 1.
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shell corporations to launder drug proceeds.227 This does not,
however, show why the wide-net beneficial ownership reporting
approach is an optimal method for looking through shell companies
that may be used by smugglers. The Patriot Act already provides an
extensive money laundering surveillance mechanism. 228  The
Treasury Department could require banks, as part of their know-
your-customer rules, to obtain identifying information about a
minimum of one beneficial owner of an entity using the bank,
particularly if the account will be used to wire money to offshore
banks. This would at least have the benefit of keeping beneficial
ownership information private, while limiting the imposition of
onerous information collection expenses on the states. The DOJ
also highlighted problems with following proceeds through foreign
correspondent bank accounts in the United States that linked to
foreign bank accounts and how having a clear beneficial ownership
picture would render that issue moot.229 Again, it seems that the
Levin Bill is intended as a patch for what the DOJ and the
Treasury Department perceive as holes in the existing Patriot Act
apparatus for detecting money laundering. But instead of resolving
those issues by amending the Patriot Act, the Levin Bill instead
seeks to sidestep the banking interest groups with a comprehensive
reporting requirement on all business entities.
The ABA has determined that the approach taken by the ULC
is consistent with the approach outlined in the FATF's
requirements. 230 The ULC's proposal is also supported by the
NASS, the National Conference of State Legislatures, the
International Association of Commercial Administrators, the
Association of Registered Agents, and the National Public Records231
Research Association. Some states have responded to DHS and
DOJ concerns by instituting requirements, similar to the ULC
proposal, that business entities desinate a responsible person to
maintain a list of beneficial owners.
D. Exemptive Relief Options to Minimize the Damage
The Levin Bill casts a wide net by requiring expensive
compliance for all corporations and LLCs in order to learn
information about a small subset that might potentially engage in
227. Id.
228. See Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. III, §§ 311-13, 351, 352, 359 and rules
promulgated thereunder.
229. Id. at 2.
230. See Hearing on S. 569, Shepherd Testimony, supra note 62, at 3.
231. Id. at 7.
232. Hearing on S. 569, Marshall Testimony, supra note 13, at 6.
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malicious activity. For instance, it might cover the professional
associations of doctors, lawyers, accountants, and other
professionals that are already heavily regulated under state law,
and it would also cover millions of small businesses.
The NASS noted that many small businesses are already
subject to reporting requirements that include beneficial ownership
information. This includes those performing professional services,
like doctors, lawyers, engineers, and realtors.233 Though this
Article offers vigorous arguments against the concept of beneficial
ownership reporting for corporate entities, in the event that such a
regime is instituted despite this Article's arguments, one way to
limit some of the damage to small businesses would be to institute
regulatory exemptive relief for businesses that already file reports
with a government entity that includes the names of the beneficial
owners. This could include, but would not be limited to,
occupational licenses, building permits, professional licenses, and
other filings.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Levin Bill stands to impose tremendous compliance costs
on millions of American businesses. The Bill's uncertainty over
the definition of "beneficial ownership" makes honest compliance
difficult, and the risks the Bill introduces of public knowledge
about proprietary business information could destroy business
development projects. Even more, it will do so the middle of an
economic recovery. The Levin Bill also stands to impose
tremendous compliance costs on state governments that adhere to
its mandates at a time when state budgets are under pressure, while
at the same time taking away grant money for more effective anti-
terrorism measures.
The general philosophy behind the Levin Bill is founded on an
erroneous assumption of reliable self-reporting of ownership
information from individuals who are simultaneously engaged in
fraud. It also envisions using surveillance of the business entity
formation system to identify suspects engaged in terrorism finance,
despite the fact that the underground banking system that those
suspects are likely to use can, by its very nature, experience few of
the same benefits that doing business through entities offers.
Further, even if the Levin Bill augments anti-terrorism efforts in a
marginal way, it offers few benefits that are not already introduced
by the existing anti-money laundering provisions of the Patriot
Act.
233. Id. at 3.
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The Levin Bill also enters the arena of business entity
formation with a complete lack of understanding of how the
creators of business entities form their collective ownership rights
and how the nature of ownership-particularly the Levin Bill's
approach of defining ownership as control-is a fluid and nebulous
concept that does not lend itself easily to the necessities of
enforcement and compliance by unsophisticated parties. Even
further, a number of constitutional challenges remain open to
obviate the Levin Bill's approach.
This Article offers a definitive critique of the Levin Bill
because the legislation presents a useful foil for the argument. The
author's policy experience consulting with the staff of the Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs and the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Development
suggests that some iteration of the Levin Bill is likely to be
implemented soon. The approach might shift, but it will
nonetheless remain tethered to the central goal of identifying
ownership of business entities with the purported result of
countering terrorism finance. As such, the arguments offered in
this Article will remain forceful, with perhaps their force at most
shifting in rank, in relation to other arguments presented in this
Article, depending on the alternative mechanisms drafted into the
Bill that is eventually made into law.
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